ENLARGEMENT OF NATO. THE NEW YORK TIMES' REACTION TO ENLARGEMENT AND TO ROMANIA'S CANDIDACY

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Since the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) witnessed a profound process of adaptation and change. In conjunction with the pursuit of new missions, one of the key elements of the alliance's transformation has been the enlargement to the East. This paper examines the issue of NATO's post-Cold War enlargement in the broader context of its adaptation to the new particularities of the international security environment. The paper suggests that changes in the alliance's mission and in the U.S. interests influenced the politics of enlargement and, consequently, the policy toward candidate countries. Romania's unexpected admission into NATO in the second round illustrates this aspect. A content analysis performed on The New York Times reveals that this newspaper's attitude toward enlargement has changed from negative in the first round to positive in the second round and that it portrayed Romania negatively in both rounds. In addition, the NYT coverage of the candidate countries was not always objective but reflected the U.S. official policy.

Since the end of the Cold War, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has undergone a major process of adaptation and change. The fall of the Berlin Wall, the collapse of the communist governments in Central Eastern Europe, the unification of Germany, the disintegration of the Soviet Union and of the Warsaw Pact obliged the allies, led by the United States, to redefine NATO's purpose and mission in order to justify its relevance in a radically different strategic context. In addition, with the new changes in the security environment brought by the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, NATO is once again in a process of substantive transformation. The alliance is moving now in new directions: from "promoting democracy and stability in Europe" to "coalitions of the willing" to fighting against terrorism and preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction.

In conjunction with the pursuit of new missions (i.e. crisis management, peacekeeping operations, combating terrorism), one of the key elements of the alliance's transformation has been the enlargement to the East. Despite the widespread pessimism of those who, in the 1990's, pointed out the weakening of NATO once the Soviet threat disappeared, the alliance has survived the end of the Cold War and enlarged twice in the last decade: first, at the Madrid summit, in 1997; and second, at the 2002 Prague summit.

Although a number of key political factors proved crucial in shaping the enlargement process, the decision to expand the alliance membership was seen

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as an American project. Each round of the post-Cold War enlargement reflected the U.S. vision of the alliance's future mission and the U.S. assessment of risks and threats. American leadership also proved crucial in choosing the countries that were invited to join in each round, based on a completely different set of criteria. Each round of enlargement had its own particularities which were influenced by the U.S. security needs, its desire to demonstrate global leadership, relations with Russia, the developments of the EU, and by the national interests of allies.

The decision to enlarge NATO did not lack controversy and witnessed intense intra-alliance divergences. In the first round, the disagreements were over the name and number of the candidate countries. Romania's candidacy was one of the most debated and represents an example of the lack of consensus among the U.S. and its European allies. Despite France's (and other European members') support, the U.S. opposed Romania's admission to NATO in 1997. However, as the essence of the second round of enlargement changed from political and economical criteria toward aspirants' strategic qualifications and how they might contribute to the U.S. war on terrorism, America supported Romania's candidacy and a "robust enlargement" of the alliance.

In the process of NATO's post-Cold War enlargement, however, far less attention was paid to the Eastern European side, by both American scholars and media. Although in the first round the alliance tried to portray the process of enlargement as fair and impartial, one in which the credentials of each candidate state were properly examined, countries that were rejected in the first round questioned the impartiality of the U.S. decision to exclude them from the admission list. Yet, their arguments and concerns were rarely taken into account on the Atlantic side. In addition, countries from Central and Eastern Europe wanted to join NATO and did not question NATO's relevance. However, their rationale for joining the alliance was in many instances different from the way the debate was framed in the U.S. and presented by the American media.

It is widely recognized that, in the realm of foreign policy and international relations, media plays an important role as a vehicle for carrying out political messages. In addition, media coverage of an event can put an issue, a region or a country on the U.S. foreign policy agenda, can stimulate action or inspire inaction. When an important issue is at stake, the media might carry the message of powerful actors and marginalize the real concerns of the less powerful or less important ones. In the enlargement debate, depending of how much support the U.S. government manifested and signaled to each candidate, that country's candidacy and image were presented by the American media accordingly.

This paper examines the issue of NATO's post-Cold War enlargement in the broader context of its "metamorphosis" and adaptation to the new particularities of the international security environment. The paper suggests that

changes in the alliance's missions and in the U.S. interests influenced the politics of enlargement and, consequently, the policy toward candidate countries. Romania's candidacy is an illustrative example. The media reverberated many times derogatory comments about some candidates and their suitability for inclusion in Western institutions. The media also mostly reflected the U.S. official policy regarding the desirability or undesirability of a candidate to join the alliance. How much such evaluations and coverage affected politics of enlargement and the fate of countries from Eastern Europe represents an important issue. Therefore, to illustrate media attitudes toward the alliance's enlargement to the East, we will present how one of the most prestigious U.S. newspapers- *The New York Times*- addressed Romania's candidacy and NATO's post-Cold War enlargement.

The first part of this paper underlines the role of U.S. leadership in preserving the alliance and in building a "*new NATO for a new era.*" It is revealed that the U.S. official attitude toward Romania dramatically changed after 9/11 terrorist attacks, which helped catapult Romania to the forefront of the aspirant candidates for the second round.

The paper presents the case of Romania; its rationale and efforts to join NATO and its possible contribution to the alliance. Using content analysis, we analyze how one particular segment of the U.S. media, *The New York Times,* covered the debate related to the post-Cold War enlargement and to Romania's candidacy.

The Evolution of the New York Times Attitudes toward NATO Enlargement in the Post-Cold War era and toward Romania's Candidacy. Among many aspects of the alliance and its transformation, an important topic for research relates to the evolution of mass-media attitudes toward NATO enlargement in the post-Cold War era. This study uses content analysis to research the following questions: (1) How did the New York Times - as one of the top U.S. newspapers with a worldwide circulation - present the NATO enlargement issue in the years following the end of the Cold War? The study will compare the New York Times coverage of the first round with the coverage of the second round and will try to identify changes in attitudes toward NATO enlargement, as well as in the focus of attention in each round. Because one of the main sources of intra-alliance disputes in the first round--and an unexpected decision in the second round— relates to Romania's admission, a subsequent question of this research relates to the New York Times' attitude towards Romania's candidacy. Specifically, this study asks the following second question: (2) Did the New York Times support, oppose or have a neutral attitude toward Romania's admission into NATO? In other words, was Romania's candidacy an important issue for the New York Times? What kind of message about this candidate did the New York Times promote?

Analytical Framework. Scholars (Domhoff, 2002; Dye, 2002) have argued that mass-media, as the opinion-shaping network, achieve the greatest success in the

area of foreign policy, where most people have little information or interest and are predisposed to agree with their leaders. At the same time, media studies argue that what appears in the media is often shaped by specialists on subject matter, including government officials and policy experts, among others. Media have a pervasive influence in the foreign policy process, shaping the tone, style and emphasis of U.S. foreign policy in various ways and to varying degrees. Press coverage of an event can put a region or an issue on the U.S. foreign-policy agenda, can call out for action or inspire inaction. Moreover, although they claim to be objective, when an important issue is at stake the media often promote or even amplify the message of a particular group of policy-making elite. In the realms of foreign policy and international relations, the media also might carry the message of powerful actors and marginalize the real concerns of the less powerful or less important ones.

One method used to identify the main issues reported by the *New York Times* during both rounds of NATO enlargement and measure the tone of coverage is content analysis. Holsti (1969) points out that contend analysis is a data-making procedure that might be performed on any communication, including the newspapers. Most frequently, content analysis (manifest and latent) is used "*to describe the attributes of messages*." (Chelcea,) Hence, one application of content analysis is the comparison of messages over time, from which "the analyst might draw inferences about trends in communication content"(Holsti, 1969, 28).

In conducting the content analysis presented in this study, we selected one prestigious U.S. newspaper - *The New York Times*, which will be referred to as "*NYT*". The fact that a single newspaper has been analyzed represents an important self-imposed limitation: no generalizations and comparisons with other sources can be made. The nature of this research and the scope of the paper does not allow a cross-national comparison or a comparison among two major U.S. newspapers or other media. Such a comparison would have been more revealing and it may be a topic for future research. The purpose of the present study is rather limited. It aims to show how the *NYT* covered the debate leading to one of the most important aspect of the alliance's transformation and, perhaps, of the U.S.' foreign policy during the post-Cold War period - enlargement to the Eastern Europe. Attitudes toward Romania are also evaluated in order to determine the extent to which Romania, as a future U.S. ally, received objective coverage.

Data Collection. The data for this study has been collected by accessing the *NYT* archives through Lexis-Nexis Academic database available on-line at Florida Atlantic University Libraries. The analysis covers the period January, 1994 - the year when President Clinton decided to support the proposal for NATO enlargement and launched the *Partnership for Peace Program*, PfP [i], as the "*stage on the road toward membership*"- to February, 2004. The year 1994

represented an important starting-point for consequent debates about NATO enlargement and, thus, for our analysis. In addition, 2004 is the year when the seven newly admitted countries formally joined the alliance.

For the purpose of this study, the time-line for the two rounds of admission have been delimitated as follows: (1) the first round refers to articles published from January, 1994 to June, 1999; (2) the second round refers to articles published from October, 2000 until February, 2004. From March, 1999, when the first three countries (Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic) formally joined NATO, until October, 2000 only three articles were published. They discuss mainly the "Kosovo issue" and therefore we decided to include them in the "first round debate" rather than in the second.

The articles have been collected by making two searches in the full-text Lexis-Nexis database. The first search was made by typing in the search bar the key-words "NATO" and "Romania." The search resulted in 302 articles. Within these articles, we performed a second more focused search. We typed in the search bar the terms "enlargement and/or expansion." Because at the beginning of the first round the term "expansion" has been more often used (even in the official statements) than "enlargement" and because since 1997, they tended to be used interchangeable in journalistic reports, searching only for "enlargement" would have skewed the database. The second search resulted in 108 articles. After reading each article, 31 articles proved to be irrelevant to the topic. In these cases, only the word "expansion" appeared and it referred to the expansion of European Union or to the U.S. alone (e.g. "expansion of the U.S. sphere of influence, or interests"). The remaining 77 articles represent the database for this research.

Data Coding. While enormous improvements have been made recently in computer software for content analysis, many scholars continue to rely on "manual" coding for more nuanced and reliable readings of the text. Because we applied content analysis to a relatively narrow case study (one newspaper, 77 articles), this allowed us to examine all articles relevant to the topic, a fact that increased the reliability and validity of coding.

Familiarity with one's data is an important step for developing reliable and valid categories. In this study each article has been read and pre-coded. The Annex 2 provides the database pre-coding sheet. The information registered for each article includes (see Annex 1 for codes)[ii]: date when the article was published, type of news (report or opinion/editorial), period (first round or second round), source (refers to people who are quoted either directly or indirectly or it may be the journalist's voice), the presence or the absence of references to Romania, the tone (positive, negative, neutral) of comments related to Romania, and all issues covered by each article.

A central problem in any research design is selection and definition of categories into which content units are to be classified. Having prepared the pre-

coding sheet which includes all relevant issues discussed by each article, we then recorded every statement related to NATO enlargement and to Romania (i.e. "NATO enlargement is a mistake", "U.S. has/ or has no interest in expanding NATO"; "Russia has nothing to fear from a bigger NATO"; "expansion increase stability and decrease the chances to war"; "expansion needs Senate's approval"; "alliance's sharp disputes over how many countries to join"; "France supports Romania" etc). Statements presented in the same article more than once, were recorded only once.

Next, for reasons of convenience and precision, we counted the relative frequency of these statements to determine how many times references to Romania and to enlargement appeared in each round of debate. After this relatively easy step, we established more general and relevant categories of themes (issues) in order to be able to make comparisons between the two rounds. Establishing these categories was the most challenging part of the research design, mainly because each round had its own particularities and, thus, quite different attention. However, we noticed that the *NYT* discussion of the pro or con enlargement arguments tended to focus on some specific issues. These issues were identical with the U.S. government's rationale for enlargement published in the 1995 "Study on NATO enlargement." Specifically, the methodology developed as follows:

1) For the *NYT* attitude toward NATO enlargement, we analyzed first the journalistic reports and identified general themes of attention, separately, for both rounds. We placed all relevant sub-topics (items) in 10 themes and counted the frequency of each theme. Table 1 and table 2 (and the corresponding graphs) which will be discussed in detail, present the codes, the frequency and percentages for the themes (issues) covered by the *NYT* during the first round and, respectively, the second round of NATO enlargement. In order to maintain the reliability and relevance of coding, identical themes were assigned identical codes for each round. For example, the theme "*intra-alliance divergences*" received the same code in both rounds. For the first round, it includes all references to the U.S.-France (or any other European ally) disputes regarding France's initial opposition to enlargement and its consequently opposition to the number of invitees, or over France's requirements to name a European commander to NATO's southern flank. For the second round, this theme (issue) also refers to the U.S.-European allied disputes, with the notation that the object of divergence was different (i.e. U.S. intervention in Iraq). For further clarification, it should be mentioned that theme (issue) 3 "*U.S. - Russia relationships*" includes all references to the following sub-topics: (a) fear of Russia's reaction; (b) Russia's attitude toward enlargement; (c) the signing of NATO-Russia Act; and (d) the U.S. efforts to "reassure Russia that enlargement posed no threat to its security." "Other issues" includes all references to the following: "U.S. efforts to reassure countries left out in the first round"; "the

Baltic"; "attitudes toward NATO future enlargements"; "new threats"; "reasserting U.S. leadership in NATO"; "EU enlargement".

Particular attention was paid to opinion/editorial pieces, as they were the main determinant of the *NYT* attitude toward the dependant variables of this study (enlargement and Romania's candidacy). The first step was to count how many op/editorials were published in each round. Second, we determined the attitude (positive, neutral, negative) toward enlargement and toward Romania of each editorial for both rounds (Table 3 and Table 4). This analysis was based on linguistic evaluation of editorialists' main assertions (i.e. "*enlarging NATO is a big mistake*", was coded -1). The vast majority of articles used unambiguous language to express their approval/disapproval for enlargement and to explain the reasons why they adopted the respective position. For example, a statement that claims "enlargement is in the U.S. interest" and then enumerates the reasons why, was coded 1. Two editorials, written by Thomas Friedman, departed from the "norm" because the journalistic tone was rather ironical. In these cases, the articles' evaluation was made by inferring conclusions from author's statements and by "*reading between the lines*." In addition, every report that just presented the facts was coded as neutral. These include official statements, without adding journalist's own opinion. If a report presented two negative and two positive comments/statements related to the same issue, it was registered as neutral. If the report presented an official position then made one or more opposed comment, it was coded accordingly (positive or negative).

Third, in order to see whether there was a relationship between support/opposition to a particular issue and the attitude toward enlargement, we recorded from each op/ed, if applied: a) the arguments pro NATO enlargement; b) the arguments against NATO enlargement we established a list with main issues (arguments) based upon which the journalists supported or opposed enlargement. Then, I determined for each op/ed, whether the journalist argued that enlarging NATO would have a positive or negative impact on a specific issue and assigned numerical codes (1 for positive impact; -1 for negative). For example, every negative comment (i.e. enlargement "*will create new divisions in Europe*", "*will alienate Russia*", etc) was assigned the code -1; every positive statement (such as "*enlargement will promote stability*", "*will deter future Russia threats*"; "*will make Europe more stable and secure*") was assigned the code 1. The results are presented in tables 5 and 6 (see also figure 5).

(2) The same methodology has been applied in analyzing the *NYT* attitude toward Romania's candidacy. First, we counted how many times the articles referred to Romania in each round of enlargement. Second, we determined the general tone (positive, neutral, negative) of editorials toward Romania, in the same way as it has been explained earlier for "enlargement." Tables 4 and 5 include the results regarding *NYT* attitudes toward Romania in the first and second round of enlargement. Figure 6 presents the evolution of the *NYT*

attitudes toward Romania from 1994 to 2004. Third, we recorded all statements about Romania, categorized them in general issues, and established the attitude toward every issue in both rounds (as shown in tables 7 and 8).

We also recorded separately (for op/ed and reports, when appropriate) the exact wording of comments (both positive and negative) about the three countries admitted in the first round. I counted their simple frequencies and compared not only the numbers with those related to Romania but also the language used to describe Romania and these three countries

Findings. During the period from January, 1994 to February, 2004, the *NYT* published 77 articles relating to the NATO enlargement debate. Twenty-eight (36.3%) of them were opinion or editorial pieces (8 opinion and 20 editorials). The remaining 49 (63.5%) were journalistic reports. Of the 77 articles, 54 (70.1%) were published in the first round (14 editorials, 5 opinions, 35 reports) and 23 (29.8%) articles were published in the second round (6 editorials, 3 opinion pieces, 14 reports).

In the first round, Romania was mentioned 44 (81.4%) times. Out of this total, 12 (27.2%) were negative comments (10 expressed in op/ed and 2 inferred from reports), 1 was coded as a positive comment and 30 (68.1%) were neutral (simply mentioning the country's name). In the second round, Romania was mentioned 17 times: 5 (29.4%) were negative comments, 2 were positive and 11 (64.7%) were neutral. As for NATO enlargement, in the first round there were 14 negative comments, 3 positive and the rest were either neutral or the issue itself was not discussed. In the second round, there were 8 positive comments about enlargement, 0 negative, the rest were neutral. The journalists cited different sources: 78 times in the first round and 33 times in the second round.

As a result of the journalistic nature of the 49 staff-written articles coded in this study, it was difficult to judge whether an article was overtly in favor or against NATO enlargement. Most of the articles were written in an "objective" tone and tended to cover the debate as it unfolded. However, an observation should be made. The most cited sources were U.S. government officials, mainly the president and other high-level officials. In the first round, the U.S. president and other members of his closest staff were cited 29 (37.2%) times; NATO officials 6 (7.6%) times; U.S. foreign policy experts 5 (6.4%) times. In contrast, Western European leaders (presidents, prime-ministers, diplomats, EU representatives) were cited 8 (10.2%) times while Central European leaders only twice (2.5%). Romanian leaders (president, prime-minister, military officials) were cited 5 (6.45%) times. In the second round, the same tendency was maintained: U.S. president and other American officials were cited 14 (42.5%) times, Western European leaders 4 (12.1%) times, Central European leaders-once. Romanians were cited 5 (15.1%) times. Yet the most cited Romanian sources were military personnel and military leaders, not Romanian government officials (president, prime-minister). The unbalanced usage of sources cited

raises the question of objectivity. Although at first sight the *NYT* reports look quite objective, in fact, they presented mainly the American government point of view and arguments.

The New York Times Coverage of NATO Enlargement. The findings of this study show that the *NYT* coverage of the first round of NATO enlargement focused on the following four issues: costs of enlargement - appeared as the main issue of journalistic reports (19.5%); intra-alliance divergences (15.6%); U.S.-Russia relationship (14.1%); U.S. domestic politics (10.9%). The rest of the issues and their frequencies and percentages are presented below in table 1 and figure 1.

Table 1. Themes (issues) covered by the NYT in the first round of NATO enlargement

Code	Issue	%	(N)
1	Costs	19.5%	(25)
2	Intra-alliance divergences	15.6%	(20)
3	U.S. - Russia relationship	14.1%	(18)
4	U.S. domestic politics	10.9%	(14)
5	Senate approval	10.2%	(13)
6	U.S. commitment to "open door" policy	7.8%	(10)
7	NATO's future/transformation	7.0%	(9)
8	Gap in military capabilities	2.3%	(3)
9	Impact of terrorist attack	-	
10	Other issues	12.5%	(16)
		100.0%	(128)



Figure 1. The percentages of themes (issues) covered by the NYT in the first round of NATO enlargement

These were among the main issues that framed the debate between different policy-experts within the U.S. government. For example, the issues of costs and costs estimates made the subject of many congressional hearings, debates among U.S. senators and policy experts. Therefore, *NYT* reports gave plenty of attention to this topic. A particular observation should be made, however, in regard to the issue that ranks second in this analysis (the intra-alliance divergences). In the first round it referred overwhelmingly to France's opposition to the number and the names of candidates proposed by the U.S. The *NYT* tried to "deconstruct" France's stubborn support for Romania and Slovenia and to suggest, as soon as 1995, that these two countries were far less qualified and, thus, impossible to get the U.S. Senate's approval. More than 60 percent of the time, Romania's name was simply mentioned without any comment about its qualifications. Every such mention was followed by statements about U.S.' intention to support only three countries, about France's opposition to this policy and, or about U.S. commitment to endorse future enlargements. The *NYT* referenced Romania mostly for the purpose of signaling clear messages from the Clinton administration to its European allies and to the rest of the candidates, not because the newspaper was concerned with Romania's fate in particular or wanted to pay a special attention to it. The Clinton administration and, accordingly, the *NYT* perceived Romania's admission as less important and less relevant for the U.S. strategic interest. Perhaps surprisingly, concerns and support were expressed for the Baltic's admissions on the grounds that they needed protection against Russia's threat more than any other country in Eastern Europe. The fact that (besides U.S.-Russia relations) the most discussed themes were U.S. domestic politics (articles paid attention to Clinton's campaign speeches and to the "Polish vote" issue), and the Senate's approval suggests that the *NYT* coverage reflected the main concerns of the U.S. administration.

In contrast to the first round, in the second round of NATO enlargement the attention shifted toward very different issues (table 2). As a result of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attack on American soil, U.S. priorities have changed and, consequently, criteria for NATO admission have changed. The U.S. officials argue since 9/11 that in order to confront the new security threats (terrorism, WMD) NATO should change its role and mission and should be able to perform out-of area operations. Therefore, NATO needs new and improved military capabilities. Not surprisingly, these arguments represented the most covered themes by the *NYT*. As table 2 shows, almost half (41.3%) of the main themes presented during the second round refer to NATO's need to transform and to improve military capabilities.

Table 2. Themes (issues) covered by the NYT in the second round of NATO enlargement

Code	Issue	(%)	N
7	NATO's future/transformation	41.3%	(26)
8	Gap in military capabilities	15.9%	(10)
3	U.S. - Russia relationship	14.3%	(9)
2	Intra-alliance divergences	7.9%	(5)
9	Impact of terrorist attack	7.9%	(5)
1	Costs	1.6%	(1)
5	Senate approval	1.6%	(1)
4	U.S. domestic politics	1.6%	(1)
6	U.S. commitment to "open door policy"	-	(0)
10	Other issues	7.9%	(5)
		100.0%	(63)



Figure 2. The percentages of themes (issues) covered by the NYT in the second round of NATO enlargement

Because the European allies have a different perception of threat and are more concerned with the prospects of European Union and, therefore, less willing to increase their defense spending, the *NYT* repeatedly (15.9%) mentioned the huge gap in military capabilities and suggested (by citing U.S. high-level officials) that increasing defense spending is a necessary measure for ensuring both U.S. and European security. It can be noticed that the weight of "U.S. domestic politics"; "Senate's approval", "Costs of enlargement" issues in the total number of topics covered in the second round decreased considerably (1.6%). Instead, a new issue started to receive more attention (7.9%) - the impact of terrorist attacks on U.S. security and on NATO's future role and

missions. Figure 3 shows the weight of themes covered by the *NYT* in both rounds of enlargement.



Figure 3. The weight of themes (issues) covered by the NYT in both rounds of NATO post-Cold War enlargement

As table 3 shows, 46.7% percent of opinion/ editorials published by the *NYT* in the first round had a negative attitude toward NATO enlargement (compared to 20% positive view of enlargement). Table 3 (and table 4) also presents the *NYT* views about Romania, which will be discussed later.

Table 3. NYT attitude toward NATO enlargement and Romania's candidacy in the first round of NATO enlargement

#	Date	Type	Attitude towards:	
			Enlargement	Romania
1	3/12/1995	Editorial	*	-1
2	5/9/1995	Editorial	-1	-1
3	5/21/1995	Opinion	*	-1
4	12/16/1996	Editorial	1	0
5	3/28/1997	Opinion	*	-1
6	5/15/1997	Editorial	-1	-1
7	5/30/1997	Opinion	0	-1
8	6/2/1997	Editorial	-1	0
9	6/26/1997	Editorial	-1	*
10	6/30/1997	Editorial	1	0
11	7/6/1997	Editorial	-1	0
12	7/9/1997	Editorial	1	0
13	7/9/1997	Editorial	-1	0
14	7/10/1997	Opinion	0	-1
15	7/13/1997	Opinion	0	1
16	7/17/1997	Editorial	*	-1
17	2/9/1998	Editorial	0	-1

#	Date	Type	Attitude towards:	
			Enlargement	Romania
18	3/5/1998	Editorial	-1	*
19	4/7/1998	Editorial	0	-1
Negative			46.7% (7)	58.8% (10)
Neutral			33.3% (5)	35.3% (6)
Positive			20.0% (3)	5.9% (1)

* Not discussed. 1 = positive. 0 = neutral. -1 = negative

In the second round of enlargement, as a result of the 9/11 terrorist attacks and of improving the relationships with Russia, the opinions about NATO enlargement have completely changed (table 4). Underlying NATO's transformation, more than half of the articles expressed a positive view about enlargement while none of the editorialists opposed it. An editorial published on December 1, 2001 cited Kissinger who recognized that he "changed his mind about Russia's reaction." The journalists declared that "all previous skepticism about NATO enlargement promoted by the *NYT* was wrong" and that "the impact of September 11 has made NATO enlargement more right than ever".

Table 4. NYT attitude toward NATO enlargement and Romania's candidacy in the second round

#	Date	Type	Attitude towards:	
			Enlargement	Romania
1	10/6/2000	Editorial	1	-1
2	2/25/2001	Opinion	0	-1
3	12/1/2001	Editorial	1	0
4	10/23/2002	Opinion	0	-1
5	11/10/2002	Editorial	0	-1
6	11/17/2002	Editorial	1	0
7	11/20/2002	Editorial	1	0
8	11/24/2002	Opinion	0	1
9	11/24/2002	Editorial	1	*
Negative			0.0% (0)	50.0% (4)
Neutral			44.4% (4)	37.5% (3)
Positive			55.6% (5)	12.5% (1)

Figure 4 shows the evolution of the NYT attitudes toward NATO's post-Cold War enlargement.



Figure 4. The evolution of the NYT attitude toward NATO enlargement in the post-Cold War era

In regards to the specific themes, the *NYT* gave special attention to Russia issue. As a general theme, U.S.-Russia relationship appeared in 14.1% of the reports in the first round and in 14.3% in the second round. The "Russia issue" represented the greatest concern of most of the *NYT* editorials. Overall, the newspaper attempted to give a balanced coverage of both arguments endorsing and opposing enlargement. A closer examination shows that, in the first round, each pro enlargement argument was sidestepped and immediately replaced with or followed by an argument opposing enlargement. Among the most cited pro-enlargement arguments (table 5) were: maintaining security and promoting stability, democracy, and market economy in Eastern Europe (12.5%); enhance U.S. security (7.8%); maintaining U.S. security umbrella and commitment in Europe (6.3%); deter/prevent future Russia aggressions (6.3%); prevent ethnic conflicts in Balkans (4.7%).

Table 5. Issues (arguments) related to NATO enlargement covered by the NYT and the attitude toward each issue in the first round

Code	Issue (Argument)	Attitude					
		Negative		Neutral	Positive		
		%	(N)	% (N)	%		(N)
1	Relationship with Russia	26.6%	(17)	-	6.3%		(4)
2	Dividing lines in Europe	12.5%	(8)	-	3.1%		(2)
3	U.S. interest	14.1%	(9)	-	7.8%		(5)
4	Democracy and stability in Europe		-	-	12.5%		(8)
5	U.S. commitment in Europe		-	-	6.3%		(4)
6	Ethnic conflicts in Balkans		-	-	4.7%		(3)
7	Strengthen NATO	1.6%	(1)	-	3.1%		(2)
8	EU enlargement		-	-	1.6%		(1)
TOTAL		54.7%	(35)	-	45.3%		(29)

In fact, the *NYT* expressed mainly the ideas of those policy experts (George Kennan, for example) and U.S. officials from the Clinton administration who opposed enlargement on the grounds that it would deteriorate U.S. relations with Russia and would provoke Russia unnecessarily (26.6% of the total arguments). The authors of these editorials feared that Russia would refuse to ratify the Start 2 Treaty and the Chemical Weapon Convention, or simply feared that enlargement would increase the rise of ultra-nationalist sentiments in Russia and thus, would have a negative impact on Russia's transition to democracy. It have also been argued by the *NYT* editorialists that enlargement would maintain and create new dividing lines in Europe (12.5%), and that committing American troops to Central Europe could not be in the U.S. interest (14.1%). Although the newspaper published in June 1997 - one month after the signing of NATO-Russia Act - Brzesinski's and Lake's editorial that strongly encouraged NATO enlargement, the general negative tone of the coverage continued until 2001. The arguments continued to express concerns toward Russia and referred to the possible intentions of U.S. and NATO to place troops or nuclear weapons on the territory of new NATO members, ignoring the NATO-Russia agreement.

In the second round, the U.S. officials and the *NYT* articles (table 6), framed enlargement as having an important role in consolidating the gains of market democracies (38.5%), in drawing Russia closer to Europe (23.1%), and in rejuvenating/strengthening NATO (23.1%).

Table 6. Issues (arguments) related to NATO enlargement covered by the NYT and the attitude toward each issue in the second round

Code	Issue (Argument)	Attitude			
		Negative % (N)	Neutral % (N)	Positive % (N)	
1	Relationship with Russia	-	-	23.1%	(3)
2	Dividing lines in Europe	-	-		-
3	U.S. interest	-	-	7.7%	(1)
4	Democracy and stability in Europe	-	-	38.5%	(5)
5	U.S. commitment in Europe	-	-		-
6	Ethnic conflicts in Balkans	-	-		-
7	Strengthen NATO	-	-	23.1%	(3)
8	EU enlargement	-	-	7.7%	(1)
		-	-	100%	(13)

Figure 5 presents the weight of issues related to NATO enlargement covered by the *NYT* in both rounds.



Figure 5. The weight of issues related to NATO enlargement covered by the NYT in both rounds

In addition to expressing a positive view of enlargement in the second round, the editorialists' attention was centered on NATO's transformation. The editorials seem to focus less on enlargement *per se* and more on the necessity - as suggested by the Bush administration - to transform NATO's missions and to improve its military capacity. A closer analysis shows that the *NYT* promoted the Bush administration's policy regarding the future of the alliance. Almost half of the sources cited (42.5%) came from President Bush and other U.S. high-level officials who argued that it is necessary to "build a new NATO, more adaptable, and more flexible." The newspaper reflected President Bush's call for the creation of NATO Rapid Reaction Force and to reduce the gap in military capabilities, suggesting that European allies must increase their defense spending. The gap in military capabilities and the changing missions of NATO made the well-known columnist Thomas Friedman — who opposed enlargement in the first round — to admit that he do not oppose enlargement anymore. The ironical tone of his editorial (i.e."what the hack, let's invite everybody in!") made clear that he does not see enlargement as an absolute necessity for the "old NATO"– which has been transformed meanwhile--but as a

way to help the "new NATO" to accomplish its missions. In this context, the fact that each of the newly admitted countries (which he called "Autocrats Anonymous") has or is in the process of developing certain "niche capabilities" (Friedman called them "boutique skills") might help the U.S. and its English-speaking allies in the fight against terrorism. In other words, the military capacity gain for NATO/U.S. is minimal but the political gain for the U.S. is important, as the Bush administration seems to favor the new concept of "coalitions of the willing."

The New York Times Coverage of Romania's Candidacy. The first observation to be made refers to the nature of the message about Romania promoted by the *NYT*. In the first round, this message was very much "in line" with the Clinton administration's policy regarding the name and number of preferred candidates to be admitted. For example, since 1994 the comments about Romania were predominantly negative. Moreover, because the semantic distinction between "Eastern Europe" and "Central Europe" (favored by all former communist countries and encouraged by the Clinton's administration) influenced positions toward enlargement, a *NYT* article published in March, 1995 made it clear that the term "Central Europe" refers only to Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic. The journalist stated that "Central Europe" does not refer to Romania and Bulgaria. By their geographical location, history and cultural heritage, these countries belong to the Balkans and, thus, to Eastern Europe. This was an important statement because it framed, from the beginning of the debate regarding NATO enlargement, what countries were officially favored by the U.S. to join, what countries would most probably be excluded, and, obviously, which position the newspaper was going to promote.

The *NYT* favored the "*small is beautiful*" policy of the Clinton administration. Other than presenting short statements or brief journalistic comments about the existence of U.S.-French divergences over this matter, the *NYT* almost completely ignored the European points of view. Tables 3 and 4 presented earlier show that 58.8% of the *NYT* views about Romania's candidacy in the first and 50% of the views expressed in the second were negative. Figure 6 presents more clear the evolution of the *NYT*' s attitudes toward Romania.



Figure 6. The evolution of NYT attitude toward Romania's candidacy to NATO in both rounds of enlargement

The coverage clearly disadvantaged Romania. Not only was there an abundance of negative comments about this country but also almost every negative statement was followed by or preceded by a positive comment about Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic. I counted as many as 17 positive comments (51% of the total comments about candidates of the first round) about the three countries and zero negative comments, compared to only 2 (0.6%) positive comments and 14 (42.4%) negative comments about Romania. The positive comments about Romania where, in fact, inferred from the paragraphs in which the journalist talked in more favorable terms--as the Madrid Summit approached - about Romania's military contribution to peacekeeping missions, about "s*ome*" progress toward democratization, and about relationships with its neighbors (signing the border treaties with Hungary and Ukraine, in particular).

Despite all the official claims to the contrary, the list of the potential member states in the first round was known by everybody: it consisted of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic. The *NYT* discourse used to describe these countries is relevant for the message it wanted to transmit. The three countries: had "*strong support from the U.S.*;" were "*governed by anti-communist regimes*," "*most probably to join*," "*the most qualified to join*;" "*front-runners in solidifying democracy;" they had "the most advanced economies,"* etc. In contrast, Romania was depicted as "*a politically fragile country;" "far from the point of establishing democracy and market economy;" "still governed by former communist;" "still struggling to establish a democratic government;" belonging "to the Balkans*"; it needed "*a more long term commitment to reform.*" Therefore, "U.S. did not support Romania's candidacy;" Romania was "*more-likely to be told to wait*;" was "*on no one's*

short list" because "*politically, economically, and militarily - the country is not in shape to join.*" Thus, it has been suggested that not only did Romania not meet political and economical criteria of U.S./NATO standards but also that, in fact, the U.S. did not encourage Romania's candidacy.

The *NYT* reinforced the policy promoted by the U.S. government and signaled to the other European allies - France, in particular- (and eventually to Romania), the intentions of the Clinton administration. This characterization, made by an influential newspaper, probably had an extremely negative impact on the U.S. and international business elites' perception of Romania, and, consequently, on Romania's image abroad and on its national interests. As table 7 shows, the lack of "U.S. support for Romania's candidacy" received the most attention (24.5%) from the *NYT*, followed by the "lack of progress toward democracy" (20.4%) and the lack of economic reforms (16.3%). Political stability (10.2%) and moral traits (8.2%) are the next most discussed negative characteristics of this country.

Table 7. Issues related to Romania's candidacy and the NYT attitude toward each issue in the first round of NATO enlargement

Code	Issues	Attitude			
		Negative % (N)		Positive % (N)	
1	U.S. support for Romania's candidacy	24.5%	(12)		-
2	Progress toward democracy	20.4%	(10)	10.2%	(5)
3	Economic reforms	16.3%	(8)		-
4	Political stability	10.2%	(5)		-
5	Moral traits/geographical place in Europe	8.2%	(4)		-
6	Military modernization/contribution		-	4.1%	(2)
7	Relationship with neighboring countries		-	6.1%	(3)
8	Strategic importance		-		-
9	Support for U.S. leadership		-		-
		79.6%	(39)	20.4%	(10)

Although in the second round (tables 3 and 4) there was a small increase in positive attitudes toward Romania (12.5% compare to 5.9%) and decrease in the negative one (from 58.8% to 50%), the editorials, overall, promoted the same unfavorable image of Romania. In the second round, the *NYT* continued to focus on the lack of economic reforms (25.8%) and other issues related to economic situation (table 8). For example, an article published in November, 2002, stated: "Romania has the lowest GDP of the 12 candidates for EU, the least foreign investment, the highest inflation, and the most corruption."

Table 8. Issues related to Romania's candidacy and the NYT attitude toward each issue in the second round of NATO enlargement

Code	Argument	Attitude			
		Negative % (N)		Positive % (N)	
1	U.S. support for Romania's candidacy		-		-
2	Progress toward democracy		-		-
3	Economic reforms	25.8%	(8)		-
4	Political stability	6.5%	(2)		-
5	Moral traits/geographical place in Europe	25.8%	(8)		-
6	Military progress/modernization		-	16.1%	(5)
7	Relationship with neighboring countries		-		-
8	Strategic importance		-	16.1%	(5)
9	Support for U.S. leadership		-	9.7%	(3)
		58.1%	(18)	41.9%	(13)

The *NYT* coverage decreased its criticism related to country's political stability (6.5% compared to 10.2%) but increased the focus of attention on Romania's moral traits (25.8%). Figure 7 presents the weight of issues related to Romania's candidacy to NATO covered by the NYT in both rounds of enlargement.



Figure 7. The weight of issues related to Romania's candidacy covered by the NYT in both rounds of NATO enlargement

The *NYT* editorials - some of them written by well-respected, influential scholars and policy experts, like Robert Kaplan - continued to draw attention, besides the economic backwardness, to the moral traits of Romanian leaders. Without any other clarifications about particular circumstances of Romania's history, Kaplan mentioned in the first round that Romania "was a Nazi ally" and that "invoking Yalta betrayal makes no sense for Romania." The editorial suggested that this is an opportunistic country, one that "switched sides in the WWII" and, therefore, an ally that, besides not being able to pay the costs for its Western integration, no one can trust. This idea was promoted in the second round, almost until the end of 2003. For example, the editorialists mentioned often, in a negative manner, that Romania was the only country to sign an agreement with the U.S. to exempt American soldiers from the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court. In addition, it has been suggested that the "U.S. tragedy of September 11 marked an opportunity Romania carefully cultivates" and that, by supporting U.S. leadership in Iraq, Romania "broke the European solidarity on this issue."

In striking contrast to the first round, during the second round the linguistic characteristics of discourse regarding Romania's candidacy and the content of the message have changed considerable. First, U.S. officials - constantly cited by the *NYT*- began to state that "e*very European nation that seeks NATO membership and is ready to share NATO's responsibilities should be welcomed in our alliance*" (President Bush's speech, published by the *NYT*, November, 2002). Second, it has been signaled that "*Romania is stable now*;" "it is, in particular, of strategic importance," "*will add to the strength of NATO*," and "represents a bridge to new Russia."

All these official signals about Romania's increased chances to join NATO in the second round (signals that started after September 11, 2001) were reflected by the *NYT* reports. From being on "no one's list" in the first round, Romania became, in the second round of *NYT* coverage, a "closer ally" to the U.S. Then, the reports' language was incrementally moving from: "*closer* ally" to "U.S. is *considering* Romania" to "*strong backing* from the U.S." to "Romania is *expected* to join" to "*in addition* to Romania, another six candidates will join." For the second time, the *NYT* reflected the evolution of the U.S. government's policy on this matter. However, while the comments about the country's weak economy and high levels of corruption were still present in the *NYT* columns at the end of 2003, the positive statements about Romania's qualifications were quite rare. When present, most of them referred to the progress in military modernization and participation in peace keeping operations (16.1%). In addition, as table 8 shows, it began to print favorable comments about the country's strategic importance for the southern flank of NATO -- that is, for the U.S. war on terrorism (16.1%) and, from 2003 on, some positive comments about Romania's support for the U.S. leadership (9.7%).

To sum up, the findings of this study show that the *NYT* coverage of NATO's post-Cold War enlargement reflected, in both rounds, the policy of the U.S. government. In the first round, the coverage replicated the main concerns of the Clinton administration and thus, focused on the costs of enlargement, relations with Russia, domestic issues, and divergences with France and other Western European allies over the names and number of candidate countries. However, the *NYT* editorials generally presented the arguments of those who opposed enlargement and who saw the end of the Cold War as a chance to cooperate with Russia and to reduce the danger of nuclear conflict. The ideas expressed by the *NYT* reinforced the arguments of those U.S. policy experts who considered that, in the absence of Russia's threat, enlargement was not in the U.S. interests, would not increase European security, and would create new dividing lines in Europe. Fear of Russia's reaction motivated George Kennan to oppose NATO's first round enlargement to Eastern Europe and so did many of the *NYT* editorialists.

In the second round, the war on terrorism profoundly changed U.S. relations with Russia. Russia has now a common cause with the West and this reduced its opposition to NATO enlargement, even for the Baltic countries. One hurdle (fear of Russia's reaction) being solved at least to some extent, those *NYT* editorialists who opposed NATO's first post-Cold War enlargement on the grounds that it would damage U.S. relations with Russia, declared in the second round that they did not oppose enlargement any longer. The war on terrorism and the Bush administration's calls for a fundamental transformation of NATO made the debate for the second round of enlargement lose almost any significance. As a result, all editorials published by the *NYT* favored NATO enlargement, or, at least, did not oppose it.

While the *NYT* attitude toward enlargement has changed from negative, in the first round, to positive in the second round, the coverage of Romania remained predominantly negative in both rounds. Although the news reports presented the U.S. administration's preferences and changing priorities, and, thus depicted in completely different language the chances of Romania to join NATO in the second round, the *NYT* editorials constantly manifested a negative attitude, focusing on Romania's economic situation and moral traits of its leadership.

Citing overwhelmingly American sources, the *NYT* reports did not pay significant attention to European points of view relating to NATO enlargement. The newspaper did not discuss until late 2003 the credentials of Romania in terms other than economics. It may be, therefore, revealing for future research, to compare the *NYT* coverage of NATO's post-Cold War enlargement with the coverage made by major Western and Eastern European newspapers. One step further in developing the topic of this paper would be the realization of a cross-

national media study which would also allow determining how American and European media present NATO's future evolution.

Conclusions

With the demise of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact, NATO, the principal instrument of U.S. foreign policy in Europe during the Cold War, witnessed a profound process of transformation. Reflecting this change, new roles and missions gradually began to dominate the discussion about the alliance's future. In the early 1990's, NATO allies acknowledged that security threats were less likely to come from calculated aggressions against their territory than from the breakdown of the communists regimes in Central and Eastern Europe, including economic and social disturbances, ethnic conflicts and territorial disputes. As a result, in place of preparing to carry out military operations only in response to an armed attack against the territory of its members, the alliance would undertake crisis management and peacekeeping operations (out-of area missions), beyond Europe's border. Although collective defense remained the core purpose of NATO, new dimensions were added to the initial security concept: the commitment to build a stronger and broader Euro-Atlantic community of democracies and, after September 11, 2001, the fight against terrorism and preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

As NATO started to redefine its security mandate more broadly, it also redefined its military strategy and force structure consistent with the new security environment. In this context, multinational rapid reaction forces increased in importance, as did the requirement for light, mobile, flexible, technologically advanced formations. NATO has also been engaged in a complex process of internal adaptation. This process includes a closer political control over military operations; the establishment of a new institutions intended to promote cooperation and to enhance political dialogue with partners; increased support for European Security and Defense Identity; the development of a special political and military consultation mechanism with Russia and Ukraine; and a great flexibility for the ad-hoc "coalition of the willing"(composed of states volunteering to participate in specific non-Article 5 operations) throughout Combined Joint Task Forces.

Another important aspect of NATO's transformation was the eastward enlargement to incorporate the Soviet Union's former satellites. Contrary to the predictions that in the absence of the Soviet threat the alliance would wither away, NATO enlarged twice in the last decade: in 1999, three former Warsaw Pact members – Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic - joined the alliance; in 2004, a larger group of seven countries received NATO membership: Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovenia, Slovakia.

As the alliance's leader, the U.S. was the key actor in NATO's post-Cold War enlargement process. Each round of enlargement reflected the U.S. vision of NATO's future mission and was influenced by the U.S. security needs, its desire to demonstrate global leadership, relations with Russia, the development of the EU, and by the national interests of the allies. The U.S. also influenced and changed criteria for membership. Although the U.S. eventually managed to create consensus among allies on the choice and number of invitees, the decision to enlarge NATO was highly controversial and witnessed intense intra-alliance divergences. Romania's candidacy illustrates the intra-alliance disputes that characterized the first round of enlargement. Romania's unexpected admission to NATO in the second round is also an example of how changes in the U.S. interests and in the alliance's mission influenced the politics of enlargement and, consequently, the policy toward candidate countries. While in 1997 the U.S. opposed membership for Romania on the grounds that it did not meet the alliance's economic and political criteria, after 9/11 the American official attitude toward Romania significantly changed. In the context of the U.S. war on terrorism, the strategic importance of Romania – which is closer to many likely crisis areas and proved willing to support the U.S.- increased and so did its chances of being admitted into NATO in 2002. For many commentators, it seemed obviously that if the September 11 terrorist attack had not occurred, the Prague invitation list would have been smaller, most probably without Romania among the invitees.

As with the other former Warsaw Pact members, Romania viewed membership in NATO as essential to securing its reintegration into the "West" and as a way to reinvigorate its shattered economy and to facilitate its accession to the EU. Therefore, in addition to illustrating the changing politics of enlargement, Romania's case also shows the differences between Romania's view of NATO and its rationale for joining the alliance on the one hand, and the manner in which the debate was framed by U.S. officials and presented by the American media, on the other hand.

Because in the realm of international relations media is an important vehicle for carrying out the political messages of powerful actors, and it has the ability to marginalize the concerns of less powerful ones, this paper analyzed how one particular segment of the American media - *The New York Times* - reflected Romania's candidacy in the general context of NATO's post-Cold War enlargement. The results of the content analysis performed on articles published over a 10-year period show that, while the *NYT* attitude toward enlargement has changed from negative in the first round to positive in the second round, this newspaper portrayed Romania extremely negatively in both rounds. The news reports presented the U.S. administration's changing priorities and, as a result, depicted in completely different language the chances of Romania to join NATO in the second round. However, the editorials published by the *NYT* constantly

manifested a negative attitude, focusing on Romania's economic situation and on the moral threats of the country's leadership. The *NYT* did not discuss until late 2003 the credentials of Romania (e.g. its participation in NATO and UN peacekeeping operations, military reform, or strategic importance) in terms other than economic. The *NYT* mostly reflected the U.S. official policy regarding the desirability or undesirability of a candidate to join the alliance and rarely paid attention to the Western or Eastern European concerns or points of view.

This paper reveals the fact that NATO's post-Cold War enlargement process was driven by the U.S. and that one of the most prestigious American newspaper reflected this situation. This research also underlines the fact that enlargement had some deficiencies, that there were differences in perceptions of the membership issue among the U.S. and Central Eastern Europeans candidates and that American media coverage of the candidate countries was not always objective. In addition, in the context of NATO's transformation after September 11, 2001, and of its future mission, public opinion and media from Central and Eastern Europe – so far supportive of NATO - might react in a less positive manner to the outcomes (e.g. possible casualties, high defense spending while reducing the funds for health care, education or for other social benefits) of these countries' membership in a such a "metamorphosed" alliance. Therefore, extensive research on Central and Eastern Europe is necessary in order to better understand the behavior of the newly admitted members and the reactions of their population, to facilitate communication among all NATO allies and the integration of these former communist countries. This region could be an evolving field of study not only for European scholars but also for the Americans scholars.

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U.S. Senate: http://www.senate.gov/

U.S. House of Representatives: http://www.house.gov/

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Notes

[i] Partnership for Peace Program. Partnership for Peace was another framework of NATO cooperation with non-NATO countries. First proposed by U.S. Secretary of Defense Les Aspin at an informal meeting of NATO defense ministers in Germany in October, 1993, the PfP was formally approved three months later, at NATO's January, 1994 Brussels summit. At that summit, NATO went well beyond declaring the addition of "cooperation" as a basic purpose. The alliance announced its intention "to launch an immediate and practical program that will transform the relationship between NATO and participating states." (North Atlantic Council Declaration, January 11, 1994). PfP purposes were defined as follows: "At a pace and scope determined by the capacity and desire of the individual participating states, will we work in concrete ways toward transparency in defense budgeting, promoting democratic control of defense ministries, joint planning, joint military exercise, and creating an ability to operate with NATO forces in such fiel ds as peacekeeping, search and rescue, and humanitarian operations, and other as may be agreed."(Ibid., p.14)
The twenty-seven PfP participants (Romania was the first PfP country) include all twenty-two non-NATO NACC participants except Tajikistan, plus Austria, Finland, Macedonia, Slovenia, Sweden, and Switzerland. In 1996, Malta withdrew from the PfP (Yost, 1998). Each partner country has concluded an Individual Partnership Program (IPP) approved on a "16+1 base" -- that is an agreement between NATO and each state.

[ii] **ANNEX 1 CODES**

A) SOURCE:
1 = Report
2 = Op/Editorial

B) PERIOD:
1 = First round
2 = Second round

C) COUNTRY MENTIONED:
1 = Yes
0 = No

D) COMMENTS ABOUT ROMANIA:
1 = Positive
0 = Neutral
-1 = Negative

E) SOURCES CITED:
1 = U.S. President
2 = U.S. officials (Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, Security Advisor, military officials, U.S. representatives to NATO)
3 = NATO officials (ex. Secretary General)
4 = Western European leaders (presidents, prime-ministers, diplomats, EU representatives)
5 = Central European leaders (presidents, prime-ministers, other officials/diplomats –including former president Vaclav Havel)
6 = Russian leaders (president, prime-minister, military officials)
7 = U.S. foreign policy experts/scholars
8 = Romanian representatives (president, prime-minister, military officials/military expert, foreign policy experts; also included here regular people cited as interviewed)
9 = U.S. Senators
0 = Journalist/author's voice