

ELITE AND MASS IDEOLOGIES ON ROMANIAN TRANSITION*

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The paper explores the main ideologies on postcommunist transition and reform in Romania, at elite and mass levels. Transition and post-communist reform are seen as two perspectives on the same process of structural change from a centralized economy and totalitarian organization to a market economy and democracy. The reform approach follows the changes from the perspective of the plan, of the target condition that is being aimed for – the society of well-being, based on freedom and competition. Transition is a “passing” from one state to another. But not just any passing, rather it is a passing that, in the vague evaluation of those that experience it, would best be as short as possible, be put behind them as quickly as possible.

Elite views on reform are categorized in terms of modernization, restructuring of different forms of capital, by analogy with medical treatment, chess play and Biblical exodus.

Mass views on post-communist transition are inferred by survey data analysis. Attitudes on change on the one hand and attitudes on community vs individual, on the other hand, are the basic dimensions structuring the mass ideologies on transition and reform in post-communist Romania. Exploring the way these attitudes structure and generate ideological groupings of the population is the purpose of the second part of the paper.

The overlapping of ideological groups and capital groups is extremely strong. Going from individualist liberalism through the communitarian liberalism, individualist pragmatism, communitarian pragmatism, communitarian conservatism series to communitarian conservatism is done by almost linearly reducing human, material and social type capital. Similarly, the level of regional development reduces as the same movement from individualist liberalism to the communitarian variety takes place. It is surprising to see how much people depend on their beliefs, including religious belief, on what they own and where they live.

“Transition” in sociology

“Transition” as intermediary unwanted states

Transition means change, that is to say a multitude of intermediary situations between two states of relative equilibrium that are identified by experience, knowledge or design. In the case of post-communist transition,

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the origin is the socialist realism of the 1980's, the intended destination, whether explicitly or implicitly, constitutes a market economy and democracy, democratic capitalism associated with well-being, competition and freedom. Whatever name is given to it, can this change be unique? Have there been similar changes in history? Is it uniform change? Is it occurring in the same way in whole of the former communist space? But inside these countries? What are its lines of force and its essential actors?

The nucleus of post-communist transition is the double reform of achieving a market economy and democracy. At first glance, I have explained the vague concept of "transition" by means of another equally imprecise concept. What is post-communist reform? What are its essential determinants – a unique process, with uniform or multiform development?

The concise answer to this question starts with the hypothesis that it is possible to identify a class of social changes unleashed by the plans of the elite and implemented by means of interaction between the elite and the masses, on the basis of some mechanisms of persuasion, contagion or constraint. The name that this normally goes under is that of reform. The clothing of the concept thus defined dresses very well the body of religious reform of the 16th century, those brought by communism through restraint and the different waves of European and Latin-American democratization following World War II. (O'Donnell, G., Schmitter, Ph., Whitehead, 1986).

Transition and post-communist reform are not two different processes, rather they are two perspectives on the same process of structural change from a centralized economy and totalitarian organization to a market economy and democracy. The reform approach follows the changes from the perspective of the plan, of the target condition that is being aimed for – the society of well-being, based on freedom and competition. Market economy and democracy are two possible names, two possible preferred models, historically founded for this aim of transition. The operational definitions and names that are given to it can differ – market socialism, modern society etc. – but the features of the market economy and of democracy, after the traumatic communist experience, can not be eliminated from the identification of the target conditions provoked by the structural changes in the former societies of state socialism.

The perspective of transition is more complex, involving more terms of reference than the reform approach. Judging a social condition from the perspective of the transition of the 1990's in Romania involves reference to existed during communism and to what is expected to exist based on the

reform plan and the similar experiences of history. The measurement of distances between present and past and between present and “desirable future” is subsumed under the perspective. The perspective of transition is broader also because it includes those changes which are associated with the actual effects of the processes of democratization and the development of the market economy. The concept of transition has, in addition, a mark of evaluation. Transition is a “passing”¹ from one state to another. But not just any passing, rather it is a passing that, in the vague evaluation of those that experience it, would best be as short as possible, be put behind them as quickly as possible. The hypothesis of the existence of a tendency in the linguistic practice of the social sciences could be formulated in order to name as transition² the changes and the passings experienced that have a most uncertain evolution and unwanted effects when taking place. There exists the tendency to label social transformations accompanied by crises as “transitions”³. On the level of the same linguistic practices of the social sciences there appears the tendency to associate the term “transition” with changes that are short-term or wanted as such. Long-term changes are given most often the name of “transformations”. The works of great impact in the social sciences create models for terminological practice. It is very likely that “the Big Transformation” of Karl Polanyi (1944), as a classic work of analysis of the passing from capitalism based only on the principle of the market to capitalism in which institutions of social protection begin to be operate, contributed substantially to the crystallization of a way of using the term “transformation” in the social sciences. But “the Big Transformation” is of long-term duration. The double movement was that of limiting the expansion of market mechanisms by means of social protection mechanisms. Once lived through, the changes get a precise name.

¹ A whole volume of historical sociology focused on the transformation of the *devălmaș* (cooperative like) villages (Stahl, 1998) illustrates the tendency of giving specific names to the processes or changes which have effected these communities: “enslavement of village communities”, “territorial expansion”, “passing from the feudal domain to the estate worked by compulsory labour”, “form of passing from .. to ..”. The labelling of some changes like “transition” is practically absent in the work mentioned.

² The idea of transition is associated with that of crisis. Illustrative in this sense is Wallerstein’s discourse. He considers that at this moment the modern world system is in crisis and that we find ourselves in transition to another mode of organisation: “The modern world system is coming to the end of its existence. At least another 50 years of terminal crises or chaos, respectively, will be necessary before we will be able to hope of entering a new order (Wallerstein, 1995, 144).

³ “Crises” is an inevitable concept (of high frequency in the analysis of post communist-transition in the case of Romania) in association with the concepts of “social politics”, “poverty”, “well-being” etc. (see, for example, Zamfir, 1999:113-148)

To reduce transition to a historical period is not sufficient. Basically, Romania has been going through transition ever since 1830. Just as many other peripheral states have been doing. It is important to emphasize the fact that, through the transition concept an approach is proposed by measuring the distances between present and origin and destination reference conditions, and also to identify mechanisms that allow the change between two temporal reference points. And it is more correct is to distinguish between transition as a period and transition as method of approach.

Elite views on post-communist transition

Analogy Approach

The coming closer to the whole, to the real complexity of post-communist reform or transition processes can be achieved by calling on the power of analogies. Out of the long series of relevant metaphors I have retained as particularly useful those of biblical exodus, the game of chess and the treatment of a sick person..

The adoption of any one of them is accompanied not only by a game of correspondences, but also by the reference to different philosophies or concepts of reform. A succinct actualization of the relevant analogies in the introduction is made with the intention of suggesting a picture of the whole concerning post-communist transition before proceeding to the analytical “dissections” in the actual chapters of the work.

The exodus of the Jews is described in the Bible as mass flight from the Egypt of the Pharaohs in order to escape slavery and to arrive in the promised land, “in a fertile and large land, in a land flowing with milk and honey, in the place of the Canaanite, the Hittite, the Amorite, the Perizzite, the Hivite, and the Jebusite” (Exodus, 4:8). Leaving slavery is begun and organized by divine order.

As also in the case of reform, departure is from a known origin, from a land of suffering, to a promised land, unknown but ideatically identified. The journey takes 40 years. During the journey, the Jews receive from God, through Moses, the Ten Commandments, rules for organizing the holy tent, work days and festive days. There are founding laws, social and religious laws. The time of exodus is extremely rich in events, in social education phenomena, phenomena of opposition between leaders, between leaders and members of the community etc. The isomorphism between the biblical phenomenon and that of transition can be established on multiple levels. Just as in the case of exodus, we again find a process of voluntary passing from a

land of slavery to a promised land (democracy, well-being, freedom etc. in the case of transition). As in the biblical sequence, change aim and plan of escape from slavery are given. The project of reform belongs to the elite. The function of the reforming leaders is, as in the case of Moses, not only that of conceiving the project for change, but also that of finding means to maintain the population on the path of reform, despite all difficulties.

Chess is another type of analogy that can be used when considering post-communist transition. For all morphologic components of the game, functional equivalents at the level of the social process are found easily:

game of chess		processes of transition
players	=	agents of reform
pieces	=	a) actors manipulated/influenced by agents, leaders b) material capital of agents
rules	=	institutions
game strategies	=	politics, reform strategies
resources for winning the game	=	human capital as reform resource
clear definition of the final situation for winning the game	=	indicators for estimating the stage or reform

The opposition between transition as exodus and transition as a game of chess leads to the clear identification of two concepts of the reform process. In the first case, the vision of dependence on the path is determined – the change is pre-determined (Rona-Tas, 1998) by the point of departure (divine will in the biblical sequence), experience of the partial reforms in the pre-transition period (resources of material capital, human capital and social capital that exists in the society for the case of reform process).

The analogy of the game of chess refers to the conception of transition as process with internal determination. The strategy is the principal factor directly influencing the result. The actors with resources of human capital and with their strategies are those that “play the game”, decide upon the fate of reform. And not just any actors, but, in particular, it is the leaders, the functional equivalent of the players who move the pieces in a game of chess. Chess pieces are carriers of ambiguity. On the one hand they signify the material resources of the agents. They are the visible stock with whose help the player can win the game. This is the associative metaphor between player and pieces. There is, however, also a metaphor based on the opposition between player and pieces: the first is the actor of the elite, agent of

construction, and the pieces are the symbol for masses, for those who experience the reform due to some mechanisms of restraint or social contagion. In the reforms effected by constraint of the kind promoted by soviet occupation, the chess pieces are not resources, rather they are the masses. At the limit, in democratic reforms, the chess pieces are material resources. In fact, even in democratic transitions, the metaphor of chess pieces can be read in both senses, as reference to the resources of the elite and as the masses that are influenced by the elite.

These two analogies, that of chess and that of exodus, refer to concepts with different functions. Through references to the succession of events of an exodus kind, justification is obtained for the slow rhythm of transition (“more than 40 years were needed to arrive in Canaan”) or possibly the narrative structures relevant to “how the process went”. Transition as a game of chess is closer to the constructivist vision – reform can be carried out, depending on the way in which rules and pieces, strategies and resources are combined in order to achieve the goals. As also in the game of chess, where all pieces are individualized by the starting position and by the syntax which is associated with it (Marcus, 1987:348), in the process of transition every category of social actors is individualized through initial disposable resources and the type of normative-institution system that regulates his moves. The exodus analogy emphasizes the opposition between the masses and the elite, whereby with the chess analogy attention is directed towards categories of actors and strategies.

However, it is true that both analogies and, implicitly, the concepts that are associated with them, can function in a justified context (“why the process is developing in this way”), a cognitive context (“how was the course of the change”) or a pragmatic context (“how can action be taken”).

From all three points of view – knowledge, justification or action – the exodus and chess visions of reform can be completed. Reform and transition are simultaneously dependents of path and voluntary construction.

What both analyses lose is speed, the mode of development of the process. In association with the exodus image, the speed of the process is slow and pre-determined. In the analysis of the game of chess the problem of speed does not occur.

For the completion of the analogy image of reform, in order to include other aspects, the metaphor of the sick was called upon. From this perspective reform can be gradual or “shock”, just as also can be the treatment of a sick person by drugs or surgery respectively. With this same logic, the

stabilization of inflation must precede or accompany liberalization and privatization. Both the metaphor of the sick person as well as the game of chess favor meditation on the types of strategies: gradualist – shock type, survival or attack, mobilization of reduced resources or of a high level of resources etc. Practically, transition as exodus is the lack of human strategies, it takes place simply as a result of historic destiny.

The three images-guide of reform no longer meet at the level of the elite, but at the level of ordinary people. On the level of individual lives the societal project is experienced either as exodus, a game of chess or as method of treatment of illness. The entrepreneurs are clearly the chess players of transition. The poor, *non*-entrepreneurs, the poor from the areas of poverty about whom will be spoken in this work are, most likely, the carriers of an exodus philosophy. For them change will come of its own or, if possible, they will avoid it.

Entrepreneurs are not the same. Some start businesses for profit, with the hope of rapid and considerable winnings. The philosophy of transition as a game of chess and radical treatment is specific to them. They accept the risks of the operation that is change. However, there also exists the survival type of entrepreneur. For him engagement in business is not so much a way of becoming rich, rather it is a means to survive. He oscillates between the philosophy of exodus and that of drug treatment or surgery.

Reform as Project of Social Change

It is true that reform as real process is dependent on factors associated with year zero of the reform, the actual reform project and the environment in which the changes happen. The understanding of this project, however, confronts itself with extremely serious provocations. The reform project is reducible to a host of public policies and projects of institutional change. It has a societal referent. The initial conditions of post-communist transition, the environment in which these develop and performances of reform are very different: depending on content, they can be of an economic, political, cultural and social nature, and, depending on the level of manifestation, they can be localized by calling on societal, regional, community or individual approaches, calling on objective-factual or subjective data. If the reform project and the performances of the reform can be followed at the social level by means of analyses which operate with factors, levels and sequences of the change, then the knowledge of the reform process necessarily implies the

conjugation of the perspectives, the compliment of macro and micro approaches and of tangible and intangible aspects of the change, the passing from knowledge based on factors to knowledge that operates with factors, relations and contexts.

The answer to all these provocations can not be given except by accepting as starting point for the analysis a theoretical model of reform with a clear specification of its components with specific dynamic, and of the adequate perspectives for their approach. Such an undertaking is all the more necessary the more the analysis is orientated towards knowledge of the social aspects of the reform. The social is, per definition, vague and spontaneous, perceivable in particular by reference to highly specified activities, such as economic and political activities.

Reforms, be they political, economic or religious represent, represent social changes or sectorial changes realized on the basis of a project which is drawn up by the elite and adopted by the masses as the result of some processes of persuasion, social contagion or constraint.

The reforms make up part of changes that are realized starting from a plan (Figure1 , Box 1). It may be a question of rapid changes in which the passing is emphasized from an illegitimate or social state, or a social state of dissatisfaction, to a new state without particular specification of the intermediary states through which must be passed. Typical of this point of view, are the political revolutions that lead to the replacement of a political regime or to coups d'état which result in a change of government. The coup de palais or the coup d'état aims to change the government or political leader. Accordingly, the event it builds is a functional one, not structural. Conversely, political revolutions are orientated towards to large, structural changes.⁴ Through these, structural events are built socially, in the sense of carriers of some structural changes. Contrary to revolutions and coups d'état, reforms imply changes that can be made during longer periods of time, starting from plans in which the intermediary steps, the states of transition, are of high importance. Considerable differences also exist, however, between reforms, even if all assume the process implementation of a project of institutional reform. Their amplitude and social impact are different. Economic reform in post-communist countries, for example, implies, in fact, the drawing up and implementation of a packet of policies and normative regulations, the construction of some institutions with the functions of economic stabilization,

⁴ "Revolutions are attempts by the subordinated groups to transform the social bases of political power" (Kimmel, 1990:6)

liberalization and privatization, etc. On a religious level, the changes promoted by Luther and Calvin in the 16th century were structural, they lead to the break with the roman catholic church. The reform promoted by them was of a structural nature. Conversely, the transformations promoted in the same century by popes, such as Paul III and Paul IV (formerly Cardinal Caraffa), or by the Oratorio of Divine Love, had as their aim reform from inside Catholicism, functional changes at the level of the catholic church (Wach, 1997: 120)

In all the processes of reform three obligatory sequences can be identified: the construction of the reform plan, the institutionalization of which and its application or implementation. The reform plan can be built, integrally or only in embryonic form, in spaces that are exterior to the actual reform, in the spaces of revolutions or social movements. Structural reforms can have their roots as a plan in partial or functional reforms. The economic and political reforms of the Central and East European countries have their origins in the revolutions of the year 1989. These revolutions were carried out in the name of democracy, market economics and, for certain sections of the population, in the name of a liberalization or reforming of socialism.⁵ Some of these countries, such as Poland and, in particular, Hungary, also benefited, however, from the experience of some attempted partial reforms, on an economic or social level, in the socialist period. In these cases, the reform plan of the 1990's had as basis not only the revolutions of 1989, but also the failed experiences of the previous partial reforms. The plan of structural reform was established with much more difficulty in countries that did not have the experience of the socialist partial reforms (Romania, Bulgaria). The place of the partial reforms was taken by the social movements ("University Square" in Romania, before the elections of May 1990) and the collective behaviors (the *mineriadas* (miner's protests) of 1990, 1991 in Romania, Easter 1995: 263-272), and by the postponement of the start of reform. In its ideal-typical form, reform assumes changes generated by a plan adopted by means of mechanisms or persuasion, imitation, incentives or constraint.

⁵ The idea that all street demonstrators in the eastern european revolutions of 1989 thought the change to be only orientated towards market economics and decomocracy represents more of a *post-factum* realisation. There were also portions of the population which participated in the street deomonstrations in the hope of being freed from totalitarianism and of building a democratic socialism that would bring an improvement to the standard of living, without, however, removing the fundamental socialist structures (Pasti, 1995: 257)

The mechanism of adopting the reform is essential for the content and the profile of the change. Persuasion and the imitation are mechanisms specific to democratic, voluntary reform.




Figure 1. Reform in the Family of Social Changes

Restraint is the method by which non-democratic, totalitarian or authoritarian reforms are realized. The majority of changes effected after the soviet occupation of Eastern Europe belongs to the series of totalitarian reforms realized by constraint. The cooperativising of agriculture carried out as a result of some threats in very different forms – from deprivation of freedom in prisons or deportations to Bărăgan (Smaranda Vultur, 1997), to the blocking of the rights of the children of the rich or of the intelligentsia to be registered in different schools, or the system of economic sanctions – is a typical example of socialist reform realized by constraint. The agricultural reform which preceded the cooperativisation of agriculture was perceived differently by the deposed as by those put in possession of land - as infringement of property rights by the former und, most likely, as social justice by the latter. For the latter, the phenomenon was perceived in the line of some historical precedents amongst which the distribution of land that followed the First World War was the closest example, with a legitimizing function.

The big religious Reform of the 16th century is, as social phenomenon, a bizarre uniting of voluntary adoption and adoption by constraint. The reformers (Wach,1997) were exceptional personalities who simultaneously brought about the beginning of some social movements and formulated at the same time the reform plans, starting from the model of primitive Christianity.

The adoption of the Reform was at the beginning voluntary, as a result of some processes of persuasion and social contagion. Later, the more the religious reform was accompanied by a political component, by the transformation of religions into state religions, the more the violence started to enforce itself as corollary of Reform. The burning on the stake of the “heretic” Miguel Servet in 1553 in Geneva, with the direct involvement of Jean Calvin (Randell, 1996:27-30), or the religious wars associated with the Reform, could be considered to be relevant examples from this point of view.

Box 1. Reform, transition and transformation

Every change presumes a succession of states of the system or field of reference, between the initial state, passing through the intermediary states, to the final state or “target”. There are no changes for which only the initial and final states can be identified. There are, however, changes for which either the maximum visibility or the main interest refer only to the two extreme states. In such cases events are discussed as being as type of social change. If the intermediary states are also considered, the change is of the process type. For their part, the processes or events can aim for structures or functioning modes of the structures. The major changes are those of a structural nature and the secondary and minor changes are of a functional kind. From their intersection, four types of change are obtained:

	structure	function
process	STRUCTURAL PROCESS	FUNCTIONAL PROCESS
event	STRUCTURAL EVENT	FUNCTIONAL EVENT

Reform is a change of the process kind, initiated by the elite, with a plan realized by the masses, based on some mechanisms of persuasion, contagion or restraint. Their obligatory components are the plan of change, the institutional construction belonging to the plan and the actual implementation of the change. Given the obligatory presence of some institutional components in its development, reform can also be considered as a type of institutional change.

Social movements are collective actions for solving gradually some social problems through the definition and the support of some plans of institutional change⁶. As collective

⁶ The orientation of the social movements for changing institutional order can be seen again both in the case of the national social movements specific to the 19th Century and in the case of new social movements. Charles Tilly (1988:1) names as national social movements “a sustained provocation of the state authorities in the name of a population that depends on a reduced level of formal power in the relations with the state”. Heberle, one of the founders of modern studies of social movements, considers that their main objective is “to establish the fundamental changes in the social order, in particular at the level of the basic institutions of property and work relations” (*apud* Gundelash, 1989: 428).

actions they have as actors groups with a reduced level of formal structuring – associations, interests groups, networks etc. They close either as a result of failed mobilization of the resources of change or due to the beginning of the actions of institutional change. Reforms can take over plans of institutional change that are constructed by social movements or political revolutions. The difference between social movements that are orientated towards structural changes and those that aim for the functional changes can be found in specialist literature, amongst others, in the distinction that Gundelach (1989:428) makes between major social movements and those that produce society by changing their institutional structures, and the secondary social movements which follow “the influence of those who make political decisions, without change of the institutional context”. The national social movements of the kind described by Tilly (1988) exemplify the major kind of movement, with impact on the production of the society.

Revolutions describe attempts at planned structural change, of the event type, with a relatively rapid succession between the initial and final states. A functional change, realized by maintain the structure, even if it is produced quickly, can not be defined as revolution. The same change can be considered both as process and event, and with and without intermediary states. Accordingly, the structural social changes can be approached, on the limit, both as process, as with reform, and as event, as with revolution. Finally, between the two types of structural change there also exists a difference in the method of realization: the violence is more frequently associated with revolutions than with reforms. Revolts are attempts at structural change of the event kind which start without there being a precedent plan for development.

In particular, the relation between revolutions, reforms and social movements constitutes a controversial specialist topic. The number of definitions which circulate in this field is immense. The afore mentioned definitions represent the result of a selection and a conceptual specification which I consider useful in the context of this work, consonantă, at the same time, with the main tradition in the field. I do not believe, however, that these definitions need to be considered substantialistically, but, rather, methodologically. They describe not as many types of relation as, in particular, perspectives of approach of some social changes.

Through “social movements” approaches are promoted that emphasize the role of the collective actors, with a low level of structuring, in the institutional and gradual solving or some social problems. The concept orientates the analysis to the changes from bottom to

⁷ See, for example, the interview with James D. Wolfensohn, the president of the World Bank, in *Transition*, volume 10, number 3, 1999. *The comprehensive development frame* (CDF) is sythesied from Wolfensohn by means of the CDF matrix. This has two dimensions. The first refers to the preconditions for lasting development and for the fight against poverty, and the second refers to the actors in the fields of development. The preconditions for lasting growth are considered to be: a) structural needs of development (efficient government, efficient legal system, well organised finance system, efficient social protection system), b) human needs (institutions of education and knowledge, institutions of health and the population), c) physical needs (water supply and sewage system, energy, roads, transport and telecommunications, lasting development, enironmental protection), d) specific rural, urban and private sector strategies, e) special national aspects. The actors of the field of development are considered to be the government bodies on the national, state, and local level, civil society in all its forms, the internal and foreign private sector and the international agents.

top, from the masses to the elite of power. On the other hand, "reform" orientates knowledge towards understanding the gradual changes which are produced from top to bottom, from the elite down to the masses, depending on a well determined plan of change. In the case of social movements, the project of change represents an output, but in the case of reform an input. Through "revolution" knowledge is orientated towards structural changes, towards the difference between an initial and a final condition. As also with social changes, revolutions have as purpose the solution of some social problems by the collective actors. If the reference is maintained by reference to this common mark, revolutions can and will be considered as social movements (Tilly, 1988).

In the series of the relevant polarities, relevant for this work, it would also be worth mentioning, in context, those between reform and transition. The sociology of reform or the sociology of transition? Which of the two approaches is legitimate? Which is adopted in this work? Initially, I had the intention of writing a volume on the sociology of reform. Afterwards I realized that the type of approach constructed during working on this work is more likely to lead to a sociology of transition. It is not only a question of two processes, but also of two perspectives. Both the sociology of reform, as well as that of transition have social change as their object of study. In the first case, the perspective is that of the project of change – agents, processes, factors, fields which favor or block the realization of political and economic reforms, of democratization and of market economics. The sociology of transition adopts the comparative perspective at the current level in relation to the situations of the communist periods, with starting point after the revolution and with the aim conditions. The sociology of reform must be evaluative in its consideration of conditions and processes from the perspective of the plan of societal change. In the case of the sociology of transition, the emphasis falls on the state of fact, and comparisons. The evaluative approaches are less necessary in a strict scientific plan. A complete series of changes which take place after year "zero", those of the revolutions of 1989, can not be evaluated strictly under the aspect of functionality for the processes of reform. It is a questions of changes which happen in the context of the collapse of communism and of the founding of the projects of democratic capitalism, but without being able to clearly establish their functionality for such a societal project.

Finally, recently, the problem also arises of distinction between "transition" and "transformation". In searching for the most adequate perspectives for approach to the changes in the former communist countries there appears also the idea of renouncing the theories of transition in favor of those of consecrated transformations. The argument of principle is that theories of transition have a teleological orientation. In their construction, the idea is implied that the meaning of change is given: "They are not constructed on casual premises, but on teleological premises.....As part of this paradigm the question can not be asked <in which direction are post-communist societies moving?>. ... As opposed to the theories of transition which emphasize the attractive power of the future, the theories of transformation emphasize the role played by the past" (Rona-Tas, 1998). Also in the series of approaches which could give substance to the new theories of transformations, the theory of dependence on the road and that of conversion of capital is mentioned. Naturally, the terminological dispute is secondary. The type of perspective which is opted for is, however, important. Currently, it must be remembered that there are three competing

perspectives: that of the reform with emphasis on the project of change, that of transformation orientated towards the identification of the role of the forces of inertia of the past, and that of transition. This latter perspective is assimilated in the approach of Rona-Tas with the perspective of reform and of the plan of change. If we consider the existing sociological literature (Centeno, 1994, Rona-Tas, 1994, Rona-Tas, 1998) and economic literature (Stiglitz,1997) in the field of post-communist transition, approaches therein promoted can be established that are capable of picking up past, present and future, the distance between a desirable future and past or present. Furthermore, there already exists a tradition of analyses dedicated to the changes of the authoritarian and totalitarian regimes (O'Donnell, G., Schmitter, Ph., Whitehead , 1986). Also, the notion of transformation is extremely broad, nearly overlapping that of change. As also with the latter, transformation can be gradual, structural, slow, rapid etc. It is true that theories of transition have a sort of teleological loading. He who adopts them no longer questions the fact that the destination of the road is known. It is equally true, however, that what is currently happening in post-communist countries is overwhelmingly influenced, not only by what was - it is not only a dependence on the road - but also by a formidable dependence on strategy, on the societal plans, on the pressure from international organisms to impose either the "Washington consensus" or the doctrine of "post-consensus Washington", or the "framework of comprehensive development".⁷

The particular nature of post-communist reforms is their attempt to impose using democratic mechanisms. The revolutions and social movements which precede them have generated images-guide of the reform, of final states which they are aiming for. The actual project of reform is, however, the result of the construction by the elite. The masses contribute to the definition of the reform plan, firstly by electing the political elite that will produce the respective project. A vote for the political parties of the right or the left, with or without historical roots, liberal, socialist or Christian-democratic, is of its own a way of contributing to the definition of the reform project. The social movements and the collective behaviors have also acted as mechanisms by which the masses have involved themselves in the definition of the reform plan. For their part, the political elite or the non-political elite of the society contribute to the definition of the respective plan by means of messages broadcast by the mass media.

Reform as Social Modernization

The post-communist reforms are normally reduced to a double dimension – market economics and democratization, to the so-called "double transition" (Centeno,1996). The social dimension of reform is invoked, but is studied relatively little. The creation of a policy of social protection is normally seen as the principal component or social reform.

A comprehensive approach to social reform involves, however, reference to both faces of the social, as group life or life of consumption.

Box 2. The Social as Group, Consumption and Socio-Human Capital

The economic is the field of utilitarian production. Culture has as nucleolus the norms and values which standardize the ways of doing, being and thinking in the society. Politics is the sphere of the power relations in social life, of the regulation relations of the circulation of scarce goods. In contrast, the social remains a vague field. It is mostly identified with group life, interaction and social integration. This differentiation of the spheres of human life is synthetically expressed by Talcott Parsons (1982) by the theory of functional needs: adaptation (economic), achieving the goal (political), integration (social) and maintaining of the latent patterns (cultural).

There also exists, however, a second sense of the notion of social, easily identified in public discourse. It is that of the social as field of the consumption and reproduction of human capital. From this perspective, education, demographic reproduction, health, household consumption, cultural consumption etc. appear as sub-field of the social. Accordingly, social policies are designed to solve the problems which arise in this area of consumption and reproduction of human capital. From the perspective of these two meanings, the stronger the infractionality and the more the poverty, the more dissatisfying is social life.

There also exists a third meaning to the social, as the field of human life opposite to that of politics and economics. It is the field of forms of human life as spontaneous elections and constructions, routinised but informal. Consumption, interaction and values are seen as a whole, as a socio-cultural field.

Operationally, the social can be approached as "space", structured by positions, relations of force which arise from the relative proportion of the different forms of capital (Bourdieu, 1989, Bourdieu, Wacquant, 1992)⁸.

A possible matrix of social space which is relevant to the procedure of this work can be defined depending on type of capital, level of accumulation of resources and perspectives of approach⁹:

⁸ Social space is conceptualised by Bourdieu (1989) as a system of relations between social positions. The distribution of the agents in social space is given by the volume of capital that they possess and by its structure as relative amount in the relation between the economic, cultural, social and symbolic capitals. The first three are fundamental. Symbolic capital is conceived as the manifestation of the other three as source of legitimisation, it is "the power accorded to those who have obtained sufficient recognition to be in a position to impose recognition" (Bourdieu, 1989:23). Cultural capital is, in essence, the existing informal capital in institutionalised, objectivised and incorporated form. Social capital is "the sum of the actual or virtual resources that accumulate at an individual or group level by virtue of the implications in a lasting network or reciprocal knowledge and recognition relations. Political capital is considered to be a special form of social capital. In general, capital is defined as "the accumulation of work (in materialised or incorporated form) which allows the agents or groups of agents to possess social energy in the form of reified or living work when it is realised on a private, exclusive basis by the agents or groups of agents. (Bourdieu, Wacquant, 1992:118-119).

⁹ For a definition of the sense which I have given to the four analytical concepts of process, structure, action and phenomenon see Sandu 1987:30-33, and for the definition of the forms of capital see Sandu, 1996.

	unit of accumulation	type of action for investment	individual/familial	community/regional	societal	organisational
human	information	knowing (education, knowledge, learning)				
symbolic	values	believing (socialisation reflexivity, experience of life etc.)				
material	goods	having				
social	relations	being (interaction for durable useful realtions)				
Perspective of approach given by orientation mainly towards aspects			spontaneous-institutional, subjective-objective, of the process-action-phenomenon-structure type			

Capital and resources are not two types of different entities, rather they are two perspectives on a zone of reality. Both capital and resources are accumulations for realizing some actions. The referent in the case of capital is the agent and the type of effort necessary for accumulation. Human capital, for example, presupposes the effort of knowledge and learning. For resources, the referent is the process of their formation and possibly the type of action which can use them. Capital is controllable by the agent and the resources can be accessible or inaccessible to the agent. The resources controlled by the agent, appropriated following an effort of investment, constitute capital.

The criterion of differentiation of the socio-human type of capital constitutes the support of the stocks with function of capital and the nature of the realized investments for the establishment of these stocks. From this point of view, the conceptual option for "human capital" is in the line of Gery Beker, it also has, however, a certain particularity.

There are, in Becker's line of interpretation of human capital (1997), three components of which, that of the informational, given by the accumulation of knowledge, that of the psycho-

¹⁰ I use the notion of human capital in the sense given by Gary Becker (1997). In general, capital is defined as a stock by means of which "income or other similar results, useful over a long period of time" are produced (Beker, 1997,17). Human capital is a information stock, condition of health and value with the function of capital: "Schooling, a practical computing course, figures on medical care and courses on the virtues of punctuality and honesty represent such capital in the sense that they improve health, they increase the profit or increase strongly the appreciation of a person.." (Beker, 1997,17). "The main characteristic that differentiates human capital from other types of captial is that which, by definition, primul se materializează în persoana care investește" (Beker, 1997,124).

biological, represented in the state of health, and that of the axiological, associated with values¹⁰. The inclusion of values in the series of the components of human capital creates certain operational and conceptual problems. The type of investment for education and state of health is different to that which leads to the adoption of some values. The adherence to belief, persuasion is specific to the values. Values are cultural entities which can be converted to material goods, productivity, power etc. That which is called “entrepreneurial spirit”, for example, represents a configuration of values – taking on of the calculated risk, openness to that which is new, valuation of labor etc. – favorable to the increased productivity. The type of capital, however, is not given by its function. Every kind of capital – material, human, social or symbolic – can be converted to nearly any other form. That which the identity of the capitals can offer is, in particular, the support and form of production thereof. The anchoring of symbolic capital in values is more in the conceptual line of Bordieu for which the word is the support of symbolic capital.

By taking on the development of social and human capital, post-communist reform is aiming towards a re-launch of the processes of social modernization. A re-launch in which sense? Real socialism pretended to be a form of modernization. Under the aspect of the development of social capital, however, it was a failure due to the promotion of the processes of social atomization, of the cultivation of suspicion and of the lack of transparency, of the establishment of social order not on trust, but on institutional fear. From this point of view, socialism acted as an anti social modernization factor. It was not the same, however, in relation to human capital. On the one hand, socialism meant, in an early stage of its trajectory, a remarkable accumulation of learning stock, simultaneously with the processes of urbanization and of extension of the social inclusion of the population in different forms of learning. The raising of human capital to the societal level in the socialist period was done, however, following the logic of technological modernization, in order to raise production. This way of investing in human capital, without securing the institutional framework for real democratization, lead to the accentuation of a contradiction between “the modernity of technology” and “the modernity of liberation” (in the terminology of Wallerstein, 1995, 126-144).

At the same time as the failure of the partial reforms and as the worsening of the economic crisis of socialism at the end of the 1970's, the break between social investment in education and the attitude of power of blocking the chances to utilize human capital. The phenomenon was of maximum clarity in the sense in which Ceaușcuist totalitarianism operated in Romania: a society with computer scientists without computer science or with

sociologists and psychologists without sociology and psychology of an applicable kind. The social disciplines with an essential role in modern life – sociology, psychology, pediatrics – were excluded, step by step, from the realm of universities in order to be suffocated and emptied of scientific content by placing them in the ideological space of the party schools.

The revolutions of 1989 of Central and Eastern Europe have as essential function the re-launch of the processes of modernization. A new societal arrangement is necessary in order to reconstruct the social capital of the society, for a more efficient conversion of socio-human capital to material capital. A latent and inconsistent modernity should pass over to a manifest and consistent modernity between different domains. Economic liberalization, political democratization and development of civil society are the main types of changes that should contribute to the realization of the re-launch of modernization (Table 1).

In context, the connection with modernity is useful, I believe, for drawing the distinction between:

- long term modernity, associated with the passing of societies from an agricultural stage to an industrial and, later, to a post-industrial and postmodern stage;
- modernity as perennial mechanism of change, as opposition between adherence to routine, to that which is constructed, versus adherence to what is new, to that which is being constructed.

Identified modernity, in the logic of the dominating ideology, with the characteristics of the central zones versus the traditionalism of the peripheral zones.

Modernization processes in different meanings are combinations of changes which lead to the realization of the states mentioned. In one form or another, different ideologies of modernization have their origins in the French Revolution of 1789. Starting with that moment ideologies of modernization started to be structured which claim that normality is change, which support “the cult of change”. Liberalism is the nucleus of modernization ideologies (Wallerstein, 1995, 71-208).

The three aspects signify manifestations of modernity and of formal modernization. By contents, modernity can be political (democratization), religious (secularization), economic (liberalization, market economics), social

(development of civil society, accumulation of community, social capital etc.), technological¹¹.

The need to measure the progress achieved on the path of reform leads to the construction of some indexes which operate precisely on the dimensions mentioned. The typical example is the index of economic liberalization (World Development Report 1996, 13-14) which is constructed by aggregation of the indicators referring to liberalization of the internal commercial transactions, of the external commercial transactions and to the creation of new private companies. In the political plan, of the maximum relevance for the state of action of the reform are the level of separation of the powers of the state, multi-partyism and correctness of the electoral voting rounds. Under the social aspect, the level of realization of the reform is given by the development of the middle class, by reduction in poverty and the crystallization of civil society.

Table 1. The Criteria for Evaluating the Performance of Reform

	Economic life	Political life	Social life	Cultural life
Institutional change, by plans	Liberalization of markets, Privatization, Institutions of the market economy Closing of the inefficient companies	Multi-partyism, Correctness of elections, Separation of the powers of the state. Local autonomy Integration in progressive global structures of market economics and democracy	Non-government organizations, Efficiency in the fight against corruption, Efficiency in social policies	Modernization of the education system, Free press, capable of passing on correct information
Spontaneous emerging change	Entrepreneurial orientations	Social movements in favor of democracy and market economics	Middle class Occupation in private sector	Manifest modernity Reformism
Level of realization of the reform plan	Economic growth	Democratization	Development of civil society, Reduction of Poverty	Cultural modernization

¹¹ On this line of content, Wallerstein (1995,127) distinguishes between the modernity of technology and the modernity of freedom. The history of the modern world system is, in his opinion, the history of conflict between the two modernities: "Between 1500 and 1800, the two modernities seemed to be in tandem. Between 1798 and 1968, their latent conflict was kept under control by means of the attempt of success of the liberal ideology to claim that the two modernities are identical. However, after 1968 the mask fell. The two modernities are in open battle (Wallerstein, 1995, 143). In his vision, the revolutions of 1989 are a continuation of those of 1968.

The fundamental equation of reform has as principal unknown the development of the middle class, the identification of the modalities of vaporization of this process. In different societies, depending on the particular situation of development, different ways of favoring the middle class are necessary. In the context of the societies which are going through post-communist transition, of the Romanian society in particular, the privatization and development processes of the private sector seem to be the principal favoring conditions for the emergence of the middle class. For their part, the consolidation of the middle class can function as principal ingredient for the imposition of democratic mechanisms in wheels of social life. Development of the private sector, the middle class and democracy function as interconnected processes, with multiple reciprocal influences. The blocking that appears in one or the other of these processes can lead directly to the blocking of the whole functional circuit of the reform processes.

A unitary concept, unanimously accepted by the middle class does not exist. The identification of which was done in different terms: of non-manual workers in opposition to the manual workers, of an amount of intermediary levels or groups, between rich and poor, of the class with a specific morale and culture etc. There exists a structural and a process vision in the definition of the middle class. *Structurally*, the mode of population distribution in the hierarchical dimension of the social structure is kept in view: Is this wealth distributed pyramidically, egalitarianly or in the structures of the diamond type (with the maximum concentration of the population in the middle of the income scale and the minimum at the extremes of maximum poverty and wealth)? *The process perspective* emphasizes the role that the intermediary segments have in the erecting of some new types of social organizations: who responds to the provocations of renewal and social rationalization? Regardless of whether the perspective adopted is of a process or structural nature, the analytical dimensions which are called upon are economic, social, political and cultural. Under the given conditions of a society in transition, orientated by the provocation of the reforms of economic and political liberalization, of maximum relevance is the interrogation in process terms: which social segments are reformist, which are mechanisms of social constitution of the nuclei which answer to the institutional provocations of reform and launch such provocations for the international field of reform?

The formative nuclei of the middle class are beginning to appear in the Romanian social landscape. Feeble, without doubt, these nuclei begin to impose themselves as presences which can no longer be neglected. It is a

presence that can be identified on a economic, political, social and cultural level. Can one speak otherwise than in a speculative way, based on simple impressions of the emergence of the middle class? The answer is affirmative. Synthetically, it can be said that the behavior model of the middle class can be recognized most easily at the level of the segment of the population that in sociological investigations appears to be placed at the top of the economic hierarchy. If we hierachize the households of the population, depending on their material position, in the group of those that represent the richest 20% of households the presence of the members of the future middle class can be found. Romanian specialist literature and the public space of debates were preoccupied, in particular, with the poorest people. The preoccupation is, no doubt, natural given the size of the phenomenon of poverty in Romania. It is just as true, however, that escape from poverty can not be effected by passive measures of social protection, but, rather, in particular, by means of active measure of promotion of the activities that generate income, by means of stimulation of the processes of social, economic and political participation. But, at the center of these processes must be precisely private initiative, the taking of risks, social creativity.

Exodus without Moses in an Ideatic Canaan

Normally, the conditions of transition are less durable than the points of equilibrium in which they appear. There are, however, societies in which transition is a near permanent state. Romanian society seems to be one from the respective series. As the totalitarian-communist reform of after 1944 began, Romanian capitalism was far from being strongly established on all socio-economic levels and sectors. For large segments of the rural population, for example, agricultural subsistence was the main mode of socio-economic organization. The inter-war period was one of consolidation of the capitalist economy and of the state of national unity. At the beginning of the 1930's, Stefan Zeletin estimated that "Romania is still in a period of transition from the old agricultural regime to the new modern, capitalist regime: the old regime was done away with, but its traces had not yet been totally eliminated, and the new regime hadn't got out of its swaddling clothes" (Zeletin, 1997:493). The dictatorship of Carol II, that is that of Antonescu, the war and the following soviet totalitarianism put a stop to the capitalist and politico-administrative transition processes. The economic, social and political transitions that began after the first World War were far from having been

completed in the 1940's. Communism came with reform by constraint - soviet, to the letter and in spirit. There began a new transition, a transition towards communism. Its distinguishing mark was the discontinuity, the break with what there had been before. A intentional break that was taken up and imposed in all spheres of life. A new kind of man of the communist type was wished for which would only then appear if all connection with the past was cut. Nonetheless, the lines of force of the past had to be clearly destroyed by means of communist irradiation, by means of the negation of private property, individual freedoms, civil society as group freedom, competition etc. If there existed in some societies, as in the Hungarian or the polish societies, room for partial reforms of capitalist-democratic orientation, in Romania there was only the question of passing from the soviet occupation to the communism of Dej and afterwards to that of Ceaușescu. In the whole socialist world, the project of transition to communism failed. The revolutions of 1989 mark this failure symbolically. From then on a new "double" transition towards a market economy and democracy is beginning. It is, in fact, also like the transition from capitalism to socialism, a transition of a total nature. The major difference resides in the fact that the mechanisms of realization are predominantly voluntary. A return to normality is desired overwhelmingly by the population. A careful examination of what happened in the relation between intentions and action leads to the finding that, for the time being, the post-communist transition of Romania took place more in the direction of underdevelopment, and the achieved construction was more on the level of a society of survival (Pasti, Miroiu, Codiță, 1997).

Communism is an historical sequence of voluntary changes carried out by violent measures of cooperativizing agriculture, abolishing some social categories by physical extermination, imposition of a way of life based on fear, duplication, atomization of social relations. In its content there also exist, however, components of modernization and social mobility. The growth in stock of school education (Holmes, 1997:239) is such a component of modernization for all socialist countries. In fact, the tension between the expectations of a population with a considerable stock of education and the mode of social organization based on force is one of the important factors that fed the revolutions of 1989. Increasing considerably the stock of education, communism intensified an immense force of modernization at the individual level. Under totalitarian or authoritarian conditions, individual modernity remained for an overwhelming part of the population at a latent level. Why

latent? For the simple reason that individual modernity cannot exist that appears outside of a liberal-democratic institutional framework.

After 1989, the reform of setting up the market economy and democracy began. It was a new road, not only of abandonment, but also of negation of the totalitarian-communist reforms. There began a new transition by the same already common procedure of negation of the previous transition.

The modern history of Romanian thus appears as a succession of non-achieved transitions that negate one another reciprocally. It seems to be the question of a series of exoduses without Moses, without political leaders who are capable of bringing the population out of the desert. Which of the figures with political profile of a maximum visibility of the 70 years of history can be considered saving or exemplary not through intentions or social projections but through achievement in national space? Naturally, between them there are enormous differences. Contexts, geopolitical pressures, abilities and very different intentions. Which of them, however, can be invoked without hesitation as effective figure and not intentional saving? In all these years, the promised land existed more in a confused-ideatic environment than as credible image or reality at the end of the road. Intentions, ideology of salvation were aplenty. The real social-historic journey was mostly on roads with dust from Shur, Sin or Sinai (Exodus, 15-19).

Hope of hidden, positive continuity remains. Although slow and winding, the road nonetheless seems to have an ascending course. This can be seen, not only in the industrial figures, agricultural figures or figures for GDP, but also, in particular, in the figures of growth in education stock and of the reduction in infant mortality¹². From where does the discontinuity of

¹² The rate of infant mortality was 175.6 per thousand in 1930. At the beginning of the communist transition in 1950, this indicator had the value of 116.7 per thousand, so that, as a result of the near linear decrease, the value for 1989 was 26 per thousand and that of 1998 was 20 per thousand. Despite this decrease, the social situation in Romania in the 1990's continues to be that of a periphery country, just as in the 1930's. Our neighbours in post-communist transition have indicators of infant mortality considerably lower. Thus, in 1996, the figures for infant mortality for Bulgaria were 15.6 per thousand, for Hungary 10.9 per thousand, for Poland 10.2 per thousand and for the Czech Republic 6.0 per thousand (Sursa: **Statistical Year Book of Romania 1998**, National Commission for Statistics and **Romania in Figures**, National Commission for Statistics, 1999).

The second indicator of social development significant for the evolutions from the communist period is education stock. At the beginning of the interval, in 1956, the section of the population over 11 years that had finished secondary school or university was 6.2%. At the last census in 1992, at the beginning of post-communist transition, this figure was 23.6%. An increase of nearly four times this percentage shows clearly the enormous accumulation of human capital realised at the societal level. Naturally the quality of this capital can be discussed in connection with the character of education in the respective period. Despite such relativisation, the fact of accumulation of human capital in the communist period cannot be ignored (Source: **Romanian Demographic Year Book**, 1996, National Commission for Statistics).

transitions and the twists and turns of “exodus” towards well-being and social freedom originate in the case of Romania? Do they come from the extremely rugged configuration of the part of the world in which we live, or from the absence of a Moses in the drought in the encountered desert? Historical experience seems to suggest the answer of double determination of the discontinuities of the transition – the geopolitical configuration and the absence of providential leaders. Or maybe it is a matter of other factors that are situated in the cultural layers of determinism. However, this land of values is so heterogeneous and with an action so mediated that its invocation is full of traps that could only be avoided in another work, explicitly and inspiredly devoted to the topic.

Mass ideologies

Attitudes on change on the one hand and attitudes on community vs individual, on the other hand, are the basic dimensions structuring the mass ideologies on transition and reform in post-communist Romania. Exploring the way these attitudes structure and generate ideological groupings of the population is the purpose of the next subchapters.

Pro-active value orientations

The empirical relationships between the regional, communitarian and individual-family status and those associated with the definition of the situation (Figure 2) are arranged according to a model of hierarchic spheres. Each of the spheres represents an organization system of material, human, social and symbolic capital¹³ with institutionalized and uninstitutionalized elements. The most general sphere is the social, national and global one. By

¹³ Social space is conceptualized by (1989) as a system of relations between social positions. The distribution of agents in social space is given by the volume of capital they own and its structure as a relative percentage in the relationships between economic, cultural, social and symbolic capitals. The first three are fundamental. Symbolic capital is conceived as a manifestation of the other three as a source of identification, it is “the power given to those that have obtained sufficient acknowledgement to be in the position to impose acknowledgement” (Bourdieu, 1989:23). Cultural capital is, in essence, informational capital existent in an institutionalized form, objectified and incorporated. Social capital is “the sum of present or virtual resources that accumulate at an individual or group level with the purpose of involving oneself in a durable network of connections and reciprocal acknowledgement”. Political capital is considered a particular form of social capital. In general, capital is defined as an “accumulation of work (in materialized or incorporated form) that, when it is achieved on a private, exclusive basis by agents or groups of agents allows them to own social energy in the form of live or reified work.” Bourdieu, Wacquant, 1992:118-119).

successive inclusion regional, communitarian and individual–family spheres are subordinated to the above mentioned sphere.




Figure 2. The theoretic model of social space spheres

Life in social space can be classified in multiple ways. The type of data I work with obliges one to conceptualize these experiences in categories of definition of situations, value orientation, and choice and consumption behavior. For each of these elements of life experiences status constraints and opportunities can be indentified. With their help “the world of life” (Schutz, 1970), can be understood as a flux of personal experience in the universe created by social space.

People’s lives progress in essence between the limits given by individual–family and regional–communitarian capital. Social spaces given by the intersection of regional–communitarian characteristics with those that define human, material and social capital are relatively stable in time. From the intersection of the composite variable of stocks of capital (CAPITAL) and regional communitarian development (COMREG) there result the main causal configurations that generate classes of specific behavior, social or cultural types. The pro–active orientation of the population is reduced almost linearly by moving from “rich in rich areas”, “rich in poor areas”¹⁴ types to “poor in rich areas” and “poor in poor areas” (Table 2).

¹⁴ In the previous study (Sandu 1996a) I used the syntagm of “status space” in a limited sens for the situations in which invidual–family capital has high values but the localization is in poor areas. In the respective space we identify the presence of rich people in poor areas, people with high levels of individual

Entrepreneurial orientation, for example, is far from being randomly distributed by social spaces. In particular, people with maximum capital at an individual–family level as well as people with maximum access to communitarian–regional resources; in other words, the rich in rich areas take risks in opening businesses. Immediately below them as propensiuone antreprenoriala we find the rich in poor areas. The greatest difference appears at the middle of the scale between those who have medium resources but live in either poor or rich areas. The zonal type of influence is considerable. For a similar level of status resources, found in the middle of the reference scale, the probability of adopting entrepreneurial behavior is much higher in poorer areas than in the rich ones. At the same point, by comparing the same type of social spaces the greatest differences are registered with regard to individual modernity, measured in this case through aversion to risk. People with medium status resources living in rich areas are more open to new things, have a higher acceptance of risk than those that have similar resources but live in poor areas. (Table 2).

Table 2. Pro–active orientation classified by types of social space

Individual–family capital →	Status space						Total
	Reduced		Average		High level		
Regional–communitarian resources →	Reduce d	High level	Reduced	High level	Reduce d	High level	
	The poor in poor areas	The poor in rich areas			The rich in poor areas	The rich in rich areas	
Pro–active orientation indexes							
Aversion to risk RISCAVER98	40.00	17.72	30.11	-10.86	-20.25	-54.82	-0.02
Favorable orientation to the maximum state MAXIMAL98	29.66	22.54	26.49	12.31	13.22	-0.50	17.13
Potential of public involvement INFLUENT98	0.24	0.26	0.31	0.32	0.44	0.41	0.33
Entrepreneurial orientation ORANT98	0.15	0.33	0.48	0.83	1.01	1.15	0.66
Using “gifts” as a means of solving personal problems in public space GIFTS98	26.06	33.33	30.15	38.08	30.65	42.56	33.55

modernism. In the context of the present paper the notion of status space is used in a larger sense, to designate the totality of social positions resulting from the intersection of status variables that measure the different forms of capital–human, material or social. In structuring this space age comes in as a composite, status variable significant for the three forms of capital previously mentioned. Status space is contrapositioned to that of communitarian–regional and societal, in this sense.

Source: BOP-FSD, 1998 The two dimensions used to defined social space (individual–family capital and communitarian–regional resources) were generated as scores by the factorial analysis presented in the annex, table F1.

Using “gifts” to solve personal problems in relations with public institutions is also a trial of social activism under the conditions in which the respective institutes do not function properly. This deviant activism is, as are the individual modernism or entrepreneurial trends, strongly dependant on status space. What matters more in this case are the communitarian–regional resources. In relatively rich areas, regardless of the status resources, the behavior of bribing is more frequent than in the poor areas (see table R7 from Appendix 2). The population in the intra-carpathian areas – Transylvania, Banat and Crisana-Maramures – is more reluctant to give bribes than the population of extra-carpathian areas (Moldova, Muntentia, Dobrogea, Oltenia and Bucharest). City dwellers who give bribes are usually from poor cities of rich counties from the Old Kingdom. On the other hand, for villagers, the favorable combination for bribing is rich city in rich county from the extra-carpathian arc. In the city, bribing is a behavior of a person with material resources and in the village it seems to be more the behavior of a “modern” type, for people who take risks.

The presence of status space as a causal configuration for “the world of life” is obvious not only by relating to satisfaction–dissatisfaction phenomena or choice behavior. Individual–family consumption is also fully influenced by the different forms of capital and communitarian–regional resources. I will consider by way of example the case of consumption at household level in rural areas. The rural household remains a unit of analysis of extreme relevancy to communitarian-regional resources. As there is an individual consumption behavior, there is also a household one, between the two types of units there being permanent interaction.

Food and non–food consumption by the rural household is overwhelmingly determined by the available stocks of capital. Available human and material capital dictates, in good measure, the level of consumption expenses, monetary and non–monetary (annex table number R4). In households with a high educational stock and with important agricultural production resources the level of consumption expenses is high. In the same series of human resources the structure of household member occupation has a significant role. The presence of at least one wage earner and, in lesser measure, of at least one pensioner directly contributes to the rise

of potential consumption. On the other hand, the presence of farmers and implicitly agriculture as a source of income under the conditions of controlling the other factors contributes to the reduction of consumption. Agricultural occupations continue to bring poverty. The optimum configuration of a rural household for well-being is the one where there are no farmers and at least one wage earner and one pensioner¹⁵.

Rural poverty, measured by the level of consumption, is maximum in households made up only of farmers, with a low level of education, run by widowed or divorced women, orientated in particular towards cereal cultivation and owning small plots of land.

Rural consumption is strongly dependent on the city, on the position of the village in comparison to the city. The situation of consumption is better in villages closer to bigger cities.

Consumption at a household level varies significantly depending on the development of the village and county of residence. A household in a village with good social infrastructure, in a developed county, clearly has a larger probability of well-being than a household in a poor village, in a poor county. Community social infrastructure is not a factor of direct influence on family consumption. Rather it is a low number of doctors and teachers in a rural village with a high rate of infantile mortality that indicates a situation of communitarian poverty and the increased probability of the whole communitarian service system functioning badly.

Liberalist and communitarian mass ideologies

Ideologies are systems of faith or substitutes for faiths (prejudice, preconceptions etc.) explicitly used to orientate human actions at an individual or social level¹⁶. At society's level, the main ideologies that are confronted in the long term, beginning with the 18th century, are liberalism, conservatism and socialism (Wallerstein, 1995). However, there are also

¹⁵ The set of fictitious variables referring to human resources in the table in annex R4 is conceived in such a way that using it does not bring multi-collinearity. The reference category, that of households formed only of people that are not wage earners, pensioners or farmers (solely domestic, for example) represent 3% of rural households of the total segment of 16733 cases.

¹⁶ Defining ideology as a system of positive and normative beliefs appears with Shils (*apud* Boudon, 1986, 33). The meaning adopted by Boudon is different. Ideology, considers the latter, is "a doctrine based on a scientific argument and endowed with a credibility that is either excessive or unfounded" (Boudon, 1986, 52). The definition given by Boudon is in good measure reducible to Shils' definition if we consider the fact that an unfounded doctrine is in fact founded on beliefs or their substitutes such as preconceptions, prejudice etc.

ideologies that found strategies for the lives of individuals, the methods of relating to family, community, state etc. The faith people have in migration, for example – is it good or bad, must be adopted only by young people, is an indicated strategy of life etc. – is an example of an ideology with direct impact on the way decisions are made, independent of resources or available information (Sandu, De Jong, 1998).

The ideologies of the post-communist transition period are extremely diverse. As is all periods of rapid historical change, they have very fertile ground at their disposal. A possible way of classifying them would be one that distinguishes ideologies of change and communitarian type ideologies. In the series of ideologies of change liberalism, nostalgic – communist visions, social – democracy, Christian – democracy, modernism are included. Each of these offer answers that are more or less different in relation to the role of the state in social life, valuing property, openness to new things, acceptance of risk etc. Communitarian ideologies offer models that relate to the family, local community, region, nations, ethnic groups, religious groups, church etc.

The data available supports the validity of such a hypothesis of grouping transition ideologies (Table F3 in Annex 2). Liberal doctrine is defining for the ideologies of change that are in social controversy. The supporters of this doctrine are identified in an empirical plan, with the help of poll data, by the fact that they have positive opinions on the restitution of property, on the minimal state in the political field and on the integration of the country in the Euro–Atlantic structures (EU and NATO). This type of liberalism centered on private property and on adopting a model of development consonant with the western one, is, at the same time consonant with supporting the Democratic Conventions. Also, being liberal and a partisan of the Romanian Democratic Conventions is strongly associated with a type of individual modernism, with the tendency of accepting the ideology of risk as a strategy of life. At the opposite pole are people who reject the liberal ideology, risk and the Convention.

The second dimension of structuring ideologies of transition is the communitarian one. Analyzed poll data indicates the fact that people that manifest a higher degree of religiousness are at the same time orientated to having faith in a larger measure in other people, different ethnic groups and the state's institutions of order, such as police and the justice system. It is also specific to them to have a higher degree of identification with the society or nation to they belong to (they are "very proud to be a citizen of Romania").

They way the mentioned ideological variables are classified suggests that in the present Romanian society the main themes of social controversy are associated with change and community. The ideological attitudes supported in the two areas are relatively independent. Through the dichotomization and the intersection of the two ideological dimensions a relevant typology for presenting ideological orientations in Romanian society at a diffuse social mental level is obtained (Table 3).

Table 3. Ideal types of ideological orientation in the period of post-communist transition

Ideologies of change	Communitarian ideologies	
	Secular – individuality	Religious – communitarian orientation
Liberalism	LIBERAL - INDIVIDUALIST	LIBERAL-COMMUNITARIAN
Pragmatism (adoption of ideologies according to context or weak ideological structuring)	PRAGMATIC-INDIVIDUALIST	PRAGMATIC-COMUNITARIAN
Conservationism (rejection of liberal models)	CONSERVATIVE - INDIVIDUALIST	CONSERVATIVE-COMUNITARIAN

The extreme types of maximum consistency are the liberal individualist and the conservative community orientated. The liberal individualist values private property highly and considers that the state should not intervene in the activity of political parties and in controlling the mass media. The western model of development is the one that seems to be the one that can be used for Romania or that at least agrees on integration in Euro-Atlantic structures. They are highly modern people but with a weak communitarian orientation. For them church, nation and community are not very important. Individuality seems to be their basic orientation in social interactions; they do not believe in God, they do not trust others as people or as groups and they are not proud to be Romanians. The communitarian conservative has all the opposite traits of the liberal: he is in favor of a maximal state, proves to be distrustful in relation to western states and believes restitution of private property is to be carried out conditionally, possibly only in very small measure. On the other hand the options of faith are very strong: he proves to be a religious person,

with a high level of trust in others and in institutions. The individual – liberal is the person in favor of minimal state intervention and the individual. The communitarian–conservative is the man of the state and community. His life strategy is based on external forces – divinity, state and community. The individual–liberal builds his life strategy by himself, relatively independently, based on laical values and is anti communitarian.

However, there are also intermediary types. The communitarian liberal is a *sui-generis* combination of modernism and traditionalism. He relates to the state and property in a liberal way but his ideology of human interaction is communitarian. In the same register of intermediary types the individual–conservative is worth mentioning. For the latter the world is dominated by private property, minimal state intervention and community. In the idea of community the human as well as the divine world are included.

The pragmatic type is the “average man” with a liberal attitude of average profile. He is neither conservative nor liberal. He either blends them together or ignores them. Some “pragmatists” are individualists others are communitarian.

Before seeing how this typology works for the available data, it should also be mentioned that the notions of liberal and conservative, with reference to the systems of mass faith, have different meanings according to context. Implicitly, relating is carried out on the type of situation in the referenced society. In the context of the 90’s, in ex-communist countries, liberalism tended to be perceived firstly as denial of communism and, in particular, as denial of maximum state intervention in social life. In the context of a society with a long capitalist tradition of democracy and market economy, the liberal is perceived as a person with a system of faiths that “support the economic intervention of the state and expansion of individual liberties; libertarian orientation supports the expansion of individual liberties but is opposed to economic intervention; the populist agrees with economic intervention but not with expanding individual rights.” (Lilie, Maddox, 1981) The typology of mass faiths that I propose for use in understanding the transition ideologies can easily be found in reference to that proposed by Lilie and Maddox and the classic one from the beginning of the 19th century:

The typology based on the liberalist ideology of the 19th century		The typology of the mass faiths system in current American society (Lilie&Maddox, 1982)		Typology of the ideologies in the period of transition
		liberal (for government intervention in the economic sphere and the increase of individual liberties)	-	conservative-individualist
liberal (minimal state intervention, increased individual liberties)	-	Libertarian	-	liberal-individualist
		Central conservative orientation (restrictions on individual freedom and minimal government intervention in the market)	-	pragmatic
			-	liberal-communitarian
conservative	-	populist (supports the intervention of the government and the limitation of individual liberties)	-	conservative-communitarian

The six ideal types of liberals or conservatives have a strong identity in social space. Values and specific status capital and forms of communitarian-regional resources are their associates. The social types of ideological content are of extremely large social consistency. The high degree of structuring the social profile is for each of the six ideological types is surprising (Table 4).

The six social-ideological types are arranged almost hierarchically from the point of view of available capital and communitarian-regional resources to which they in principle have access. The individualist liberals are the wealthiest, with the highest relational and human capital. Living in developed towns in developed counties, which in 1996 were overwhelmingly in favor of CDR and Emil Constantinescu. There are the towns in which the communitarian environment was and is very favorable to change. In terms of age, they are the youngest group.

Table 4. The status profile of social types according to their ideology

The status profile indexes *	Conservative-communitarian	Conservative-individualist	Pragmatic-communitarian	Pragmatic-individualist	Liberal-communitarian	Liberal-individualist	Total
Age	53.40	44.67	47.75	43.50	46.82	41.95	46.39
Average number of years of school graduated EDUCANI	8.21	8.86	9.16	10.37	11.08	11.29	9.84
Modern GOODS in the household	0.94	1.06	1.26	1.36	1.59	1.60	1.30
Relational Capital RELATH99	1.13	1.11	1.13	1.53	1.50	1.86	1.38
Average level of income per person in the last month (thousands of lei) VENPERS	702.60	724.52	721.25	897.96	1143.34	1193.01	897.66
Percentage of people from the group that were managers before 1989	31	30	37	44	44	53	40
Percentage of people that are currently managers	19	19	23	32	31	37	27
Percentage of people in urban areas	42	54	46	60	58	66	55
Percentage of men	45	44	46	49	50	58	49
Mass-media consumption MEDIA	-35.93	-32.65	-7.96	19.21	28.14	27.35	0.00
Average level development of town of residence QLIFE/UR	46.47	61.32	52.90	72.37	62.52	84.91	63.44
Level of development of county of residence DEVJUD95	0.26	2.71	3.00	3.90	6.02	6.07	3.65
Percentage of people in towns near European roads EURO	30	44	39	57	56	61	48
Percentage of votes for Emil Constantinescu in the town in 1996 EMIL96	47.78	51.85	50.35	54.36	55.68	60.76	53.44

All values in the table for which the type of statistic is not mentioned represent averages. The analysis is relevant only for the social profile of the ideological types. The percentage of these types in the adult population of the country cannot be identified by the methodology on which the table is based: the degree of liberal or communitarian orientation is given by the position of the individual on a scale of factorial score at whose level there are only standardized levels (series with 0 average and standard deviation of 1).

The communitarian conservative is opposed to the individual liberal not only in values and attitude, but also in terms of resources and the capital that he controls. His mark is poverty of capital: low level of education, relational and material capital. The towns and counties in which such a conservative lives are among the poorest. If the individual liberalist is made up mainly of men that live in the city, the communitarian conservative is made up mainly of women from rural areas. Thus, with this analysis, a cultural dimension of opposition between polar social types of "rich in rich area" versus "poor in poor area" is identified. As expected, a conservative-communitarian culture for the poor and a liberal individualist one for the rich is easily identified. Clearly, it is a question of the "rich" and the "poor" in a relative way, in the context of Romania in the 90's.

Why are some liberals of an individualist orientation and others of a communitarian one? Once the inspection of the poll data has been formulated, by applying a processing algorithm, an answer can be obtained: liberal individualists as compared to communitarian ones tend to be younger men from towns where modernism and liberalism are strongly valued. Surprisingly, the highest percentage of ex-leaders from the communist period is of liberal individualists (Table 4)¹⁷. This finding leads to the hypothesis of considering managerial experience during communism as a factor of liberal orientation. The fact that leadership experience in the communist period refers mainly to the professional aspect ("did you have at least three subordinates"), and not the political one, is underlined. Of course, it would have been optimum for there to be information collected with questionnaires in relation to the political functions of the people interviewed as well. Even in the absence of such data, the finding that professional leaders of communism are currently in an overwhelming proportion liberal individualists is significant.

¹⁷ The comparison of liberal individualists with communitarian ones is done through logistic regression in which only people that belong to one of the two categories remain. The logistic regression model is built by using predictors from Table 4. All the other logistic models with other pairs of ideologic types are built in the same manner of extraction from the data of those that refer only to the compared categories. In the interpretation the predictors are mentioned that register logistic regression coefficients of a significant statistic level for $p < 0.05$.

The fact of being a leader at the respective time significantly contributed to the style of liberalism they adopted – individualist and not communitarian.

Regarding styles of conservatism, individualist or communitarian, the determination is much simpler. In this case what matters is only age: to be younger leads to individualism and to be older favors communitarian orientation.

Towards the center of the ideological scale, in the are of the pragmatists who are neither liberal nor conservative, the differentiation between individualists and communitarians is made, in particular, in connection with a good material state. Wealthier people have a higher tendency to adopt the individualist style of pragmatism than the communitarian one.

In General, liberal–modernism ideologies are fueled by a high level of education or, and more generally, by consistent stocks of human capital (Table 5). This finding is consistent with the results obtained in polls made in different countries. The modern–liberal ideologies are favored not only by individual characteristics – high levels of education, income and media information – but also by the communitarian environment of life. In the towns where, in 1996, more votes were registered for the candidate of the center–right political formation CDR, that is for Emil Constantinescu, there is found a large propensity of individuals with ideologies of modernism and liberalism. The voting pattern at a local level seems to be a good indicator of the liberal–conservative orientation of the population.

Table 5 .Predictors of the main types of ideological orientations.

Predictors	Dependant variables	
	Ideology favorable to change CHANGE	Ideology favorable to the community COMMUNITY
Age	(-0.01)	0.24
Average number of years of school graduated EDUCANI	0.17	(0.04)
Modern GOODS in the household	(0.04)	(0.04)
Relational Capital RELATII99	(0.01)	(0.00)
Average level of income per person in the last month (thousands of lei) VENPERS	0.09	(0.02)
Percentage of people from the group that were	(0.04)	-0.07

Predictors	Dependant variables	
	Ideology favorable to change CHANGE	Ideology favorable to the community COMMUNITY
managers before 1989		
Percentage of people that are currently managers	(-0.01)	(-0.02)
Percentage of people in urban areas	(-0.02)	(-0.06)
Percentage of men	0.04	-0.05
Mass-media consumption MEDIA	0.14	0.07
Average level of development of town of residence QLIFE/UR	-0.09	(-0.02)
The level of development of county of residence DEVJUD95	(0.001)	(0.03)
Percentage of people in towns near European roads EURO	(0.05)	-0.07
Percentage of votes for Emil Constantinescu in the town in 1996 EMIL96	0.14	-0.11
R ²	0.16	0.09

Source BOP-FSD, 1999. Each column of the table presents a multiple regression model with standardized partial regression coefficients. All the beta coefficients that are not in parantheses () are significant for $p=0.05$. For the definition of the variables see Annex.

The data from the *World Value Survey* indicate the fact that the major tendency at the level of 41 societies is that the belief in adopting a conservative attitude ("our society must be decidedly defended from subversive forces") is stronger where the level of education is lower. Thus, of the cumulatd segment of 41 soiceties 12% of those with higher education are registered as having the same opinion. The corresponding percentages for those with medium and low levels of education are 17% and 23% (Inglehart, Basanez and Moreno, 1998,V249). The contingency charts reported for the same variable dependant on conservativisms indicates the emphasizing of the phenomenon along with the rise in the degree of poverty (reduction of income, repectively). Finally, conservatism is reduced for people and societies in which the post-materialist values have a higher extension in comparisson to the material ones. Women are more conservative than men. Even though the way in which conservatism/liberalism are measured in the *World Value Survey* and in the present study are different, the results are consistent: liberalism tends to be stronger amongst educated men with a high level of income.

The Bravais-Pearson correlation between the index of the developmentof the town and the favorable orientation towards change CHANGE is positive ($r=0.08$, significant for $p<0.01$). At the time when the status variables are controlled – education, media consumption etc. – the meaning of the relation between the ideology of change and the development of the town changes – a higher modernism appears for people with high human capital from relatively poor towns. In such cases it seems to be a question of the effect of answering the conditions of the adverse environment, given especially by people with a high level of capital stock. Even though it may seem surprising, the result of this

analysis is supported by other data as well. Inspecting some older polls, from 1991 and 1993, allowed a hypothesis to take shape that the highest degree of modernism is found with people with rich capital resources in poor areas (Sandu, 1996a, 117).

In General, under the conditions in Romania in the 90's, the communitarian ideologies are mainly supported by isolation and tradition. This fact becomes more obvious if we relate to the nucleus of communitarian ideologies, respectively the state of religiousness. People who believe most in God are elderly women, with a low level of education, with reduced migration experience, living in poor counties. It is a state of religiousness that appears mostly as a reflex of regional poverty and of low level of human capital. Of course, religiousness is not reduced to this type of conditioning through poverty of resources. At the moment, however, this is the dominant type in Romania.

It should also be noted that leadership experience in the communist period appears as a favoring factor of laical type orientations. People that were connected to professional leadership in the communist years are less religious. It is very probably a question of the effect of more intense exposure to communist propaganda.

Conclusions

The primary matter from which the life experiences of people are interwoven, "the world of life", is given by evaluation, faith, consumption and choice (Figure 2). Or, more precisely, it is about defining situation, value orientations, consumption behavior and choice behavior. The different combinations that give the content of experience of life at an individual or family level are according to personal history and the game of constraint – opportunity from the level of superior spheres such as communitarian–regional or societal. Whatever people feel – satisfaction, discontent, optimism, pessimism etc. – as well as what they consider desirable or reproachable, the values that structure their life are in good measure "closed in status space". Through the formula of captivity or closure of human experiences in the described perimeter of objective characteristics we see a situation of strong dependence on what people feel, believe and know, according to their available capital and the resources of the environment in which they live. "The world of life" in periods of transition, especially for poor societies, tends to be one of constraint. Status constraints are replacing more and more the political constraints from the communist era. The capitals

that people have and the communitarian–regional resources that they have access to are fundamental to the way they live and organize their lives.

“The world of life” from the post–communist transition period in Romania of the 90’s can be relatively easily read on three axes or with the aid of three perspectives – that of social spaces, of situation definitions and that of undertaken ideologies. Almost nothing that happens in the sphere of individual–family experiences can escape the reductionalism of these plans. From the perspective of social space the opposition between the rich in rich areas and the poor in poor areas is important. Propensity towards social activism, towards dynamic manifestation, is reduced by moving from those who have consistent stocks of capital and live in communitarian – regional rich space, towards those that are poor in poor areas. The former accept risks easier than the latter, they have an entrepreneurial orientation that is better crystallized, they expect less from the state and more from themselves. The social space of status is strongly structured according to the relationship between stocks of individual–family capital and communitarian capital. The two types of stock are significantly dependent: the richer the region or community of residence, the greater the stock of individual status capital (table F3 in the annex 2).

Is the inclusion of situation defining groups and of the ideological ones in the general picture opportune? This topic can be debated. The decision to include them in a phenomenological picture of social structure (Figure 3) comes from the salience with which such groups imposed themselves in the exploratory empirical analysis, which evolved within the capitol. What people believe and feel is not only influenced by what they own, the capital they have, but also influences the different forms of capital. This, in fact, is the main premise of the phenomenological perspective of the social structure. And as transition to capitalism is not only achieved with resources but also with social definitions and beliefs it is important that the essential terms of the process are placed in the same conceptualization which in the present situation is one of “social structure in phenomenological perspective”.




Figure 3 A phenomenological perspective of social structure

The nucleus of understanding the phenomenological perspective of social structure is the idea that values, satisfaction and behavior are, in essence, under the direct or indirect influence of the relation between status capital and communitarian capital, between what people have as goods, beliefs, information and connections and what they can have as members of a local community or region. The typical example for the importance of the relation between personal and communitarian–regional capital is individual modernism. The data analyzed proves the idea that modern ideologies and behavior are more frequent for the rich in poor areas, for the people that have available individual–family capital but who live in poor areas. In the absence of an approach that would emphasize the individual–community relationship, such a regularity could not be emphasized.

The ideologies themselves are themselves a factor of social structuring. The inclusion of ideological groupings in the ensemble configuration of social structure of societies in transition, of Romania’s in the 90’s in particular, is based on the premise that, eventually, the different social orders result from beliefs and resources. What people have and believe dictates in good measure their life strategies, civic implication, economic orientation and, finally, their arrangement in cumulative social groups. The overlapping of ideological groups and capital groups is extremely strong. Going from individualist

liberalism through the communitarian liberalism, individualist pragmatism, communitarian pragmatism, communitarian conservatism series to communitarian conservatism is done by almost linearly reducing human, material and social type capital. Similarly, the level of regional development reduces as the same movement from individualist liberalism to the communitarian variety takes place. It is surprising to see how much people depend on their beliefs, including religious belief, on what they own and where they live. Religiousness, for example, is strongly dependent on status characteristics that are not a result of personal efforts, are not gained, but are attributed or inherited. People with a maximum degree of religiousness are elderly women who live in villages in poor regions, lacking migration experience in their lifetime. Only school education and leadership experience in the communist period, negatively correlated with religiousness, are status characteristics gained through personal effort. This high dependence on inherited status characteristics seems to be a characteristic of poor societies in the transition process. The migratory return to cities/villages phenomena are symptomatic of the emphasizing of the dependence of ways of life on traditional contexts, for re-traditionalisation (Barbara Adam, 1996,140) of societies in crisis or with failures in the modernization process.

The tension between the ideologies of change with their liberalist and conservative alternatives and the communitarian ones expressed through individualism and communitarian orientation is long term. The have and will mark the space of public debate on transition.

For each of the three major elements of social structure in the period of transition specific tendencies can be registered. The “waves” of the experienced liberalism, communitarian orientation, and long-term satisfaction and of the variation of status capital have correlated dynamics, dependant of the rhythms of reform. In the beginning, right after 1989 it was about a denial reform associated with a very generous “gift” faith placed by the population in the new government. The denial reform defined the new emergent society as a denial of the pathologic characteristics of communism, as a society that is no longer run by a totalitarian and centralist system. It was more a denial of the state of fact and the punctual way than the ideology. Market economy was accepted superficially without ample privatization (Table 2-1). The elections in 1992 were dominated by an anticipative reform. The discussion of means begins. Everything progresses, however, as in anticipative socialization. Reform is still talked about more than experienced. The period of 1992 – 1997 remains one of hesitation between reaction and anticipated reform. A

clear installation of reaction reform, the one expressed as a reaction to the way in which a reform is carried out or not, can be seen in 1998 and 1999. The last miner's protest (*mineriade*) in January 1999 was a clear expression of reaction reform. The population began to react violently to a restructuring policy that progresses without the necessary accompaniment of regional compensation policies for the suffering induced by the loss of jobs and there being a lack of alternative viable work places. The evaluation of the event, at the level of common conscience, is made strictly according to the type of ideology that models the conscience of the respective person (Table 6).

Table 6. Evaluation of the miner's protest (*mineriade*) in January 1999 according to type of ideology

Type of ideology of the person interviewed	Medium grade given to actors associated with the events in Costești-Vâlcea in January 1999, for			
	Miners who took part in the march	Local populations in league with the miners	Miron Cosma, the leader of the miners	Prime minister Radu Vasile
conservative-communitarian	5.53	5.29	4.63	5.44
Conservative-individualist	5.28	5.19	4.54	4.86
pragmatic-communitarian	4.79	4.74	3.89	6.31
pragmatic-individualist	4.64	4.57	4.01	5.76
liberal-communitarian	3.43	3.47	2.93	7.36
liberal-individualist	3.43	3.57	2.85	6.56
Total	4.49	4.44	3.78	6.09

Source: BOP-FSD, May 1999. Each subject was asked evaluate each of the actors that took part in the events on a scale of 1 (very bad behavior) to 10 (very good behavior). To define the types of ideology see Table 3.

The typology built by intersecting the two ideologies proves to be extremely relevant to interpreting a social movement of the miners' protest (*mineriade*) of January 1999. From conservatives to liberals, and from communitarian to individualists, the grade given to miners or locals involved in the protest decreases continuously. The monotonous type variation of the evaluation is no longer registered in connection to the "pacifier" Radu Vasile. In this case, for the same level of liberalism or conservativeness, the maximum grades are given by the people with a communitarian orientation.

This fact can be related to an increasing value that communitarian ideologies give the actions with a socio-integration character.

Finally, in connection to the evolution of the indexes of optimism-pessimism and satisfaction-dissatisfaction after 1991, arguments of rejection are made of the thesis that explains the rising discontent of the population through strictly cultural factors such as “the Romanian’s or the voter’s criticism”. The analysis of the series of data for almost ten years indicates the fact that the variation of social curves is mainly explained by electoral and economic cycles. Right after the elections (1992) or even a little before a predictable electoral victory (1996) “social eruptions” of optimism are registered. It is a type of optimism associated with “gift faith” attributed to the new leaders. Between the electoral cycles, however, the processes of impoverishment play very strongly.

For the interpretation of the evolutions connected to optimism, the concept of “captive optimism” appears.

It is a social phenomenon that appears after periods of eruptions of expectations, hopes. After the elections in 1996, the years 1997 – 1999 were years of captive optimism. Social pessimism becomes dominant in connection to the emphasis of poverty and the delay of the savior reforms promised by the new power.

Begun as exploratory research, the analysis of social space of status finally leads to the identification of a system of indexes for the phenomenological analysis of social structure under the conditions of post-communist transition. The three types of social groups – status, ideological and definition of social status – result from the intersection of a multitude of criteria presented in the tree in Figure 4. The description of the social structure is phenomenological in the sense that it includes, obligatorily, the subjective indexes next to the regular, and objective one. The new social structure in Romania, during its forming, moves along lines of structuring given by resources and modernism. The ideology of modernism is positively associated with long-term satisfaction phenomena. The people with strong modern and liberal orientation are, at the same time, optimistic perceiving progress in their life.

Communitarian ideologies marked by religiousness, nationalism and generalized faith, seem to have a closer dynamic to that of the resources than to that of the ideology trend of modernism. Reduced individual, family and community resources characterize people that are community orientated.

Faith and religiousness seem to be more a reaction to poor environments than a value option in the true sense of the word.

The “modernism ideology” factor has a very close structure to that of the “cultural complex of reform” (COREF). COREF was defined (Sandu 1996a) as a “hard” attitude structure, formed by association with modern individuality, reform and positive diffuse definition of the environment of interaction. Modernism and reform as ideologies of active change were presented as a COREF nucleus, using poll data from 1991, 1993 and 1995. On resuming the issue, with a set of data from 1999 and a completely different methodology, an identification of a factor is reached that has practically the same structure as what I named COREF. It is the MODERNISM factor from Figure 4. Individual modernism and reform clearly appear in the same factor of level II aggregation. Individual modernism, reformism given by liberal ideologies and positive defining of situations through optimism are associated in a unique factor known as MODERNISM on level I aggregation. The sole difference to the empirical definition of COREF in the study from 1996 resides in the position faith has. In defining COREF interpersonal trust was associated with optimism in diffuse defining of the situation.




Figure 4. The system of indicators used to describe the social structure phenomenologically

Indexes from level two are factorially grouped in accordance with the arboreal structure that leads to level 1. The five level II indexes were included in a VARIMAX – PROMAX factorial model and generated level I factors. The two big dimensions of social structure, the subjective MODERNISM and the objective RESOURCES are positively correlated (0.14 correlation)

between the generated factors). Each of the level II latent variables is determined as a factorial score according to level III indexes. All variables marked with an asterisk are either factorial score, numbering or sum type indexes. Their description is made in tables A1 and A3. The meanings of the correlations between factors or between factors and variables are marked with + and -.

In the new structure used to analyze social structures and status space, trust appears not in association with optimism but with communitarian ideologies, in association with religiousness and the national feeling. Inconsistency has many sources. Faith in the model with data from 1999 is a complex measure that includes not only interpersonal trust, but also that of groups and institutions. Additionally, in the new model, built through the aggregation of multiple factorial analyses, there appear other variables that were taken into consideration in "The Sociology of Transition", the study from 1996. Particularly appears religiousness, a variable with a much larger power of attraction on faith than optimism. The supplementary proof of consistency between COREF, in the definition from 1996 and MODERNISM in the acceptance of 1999 is the fact that the "rebel" variable referring to faith appears in all the models from 1996 in a marginal position in the cultural complex of reform (Sandu, 1996,263,266).

Finding COREF in the ensemble of variables that are defining to the social structure emphasizes the fact that social groups of transition, relevant to the degree of social differentiation and to the way in which social life is spontaneously organized, include as an essential element of the structure of the attitude to reform and individual modernism. Social structure of transition is given by a combination of resources and attitudes that favor or do not favor the progress of reform. The most conclusive example for the relevancy of the proposed point of view can be found in relation to the entrepreneurs. They are clearly a group of the new economic elite of society. Their identification as an element of social structure cannot be made only through referring to resources but also to subjective variables. The famous entrepreneurial spirit is nothing other than a manifestation of modernism and reform, under the given conditions of transition.

Annex 1: Description of the variables used for analysis

Table A 1. Operational definition of the main individual/family level variables

Variable label and name	Description of the variable
ACUM/IERI Present vs past life evaluation	Evaluation of own life at present compared to one year before (five points scale)
BUNURI Durable goods in the household	Counting index of household endowment with color TV, refrigerator and automatic washing machine (0 for non of them and 3 for all of them)
EDUCANI Education level of the person	0 illiterate, 4 primary, 8 gymnasium, 10 vocational school, 12 high school, 14 post-high school, 16 high education
GIFTS98	frequency of offering presents for solving personal problems to mazor house, court, police, hospital, school, job. Each of the six items is scaled 1 for „always”, 0.5 for sometime and 0 for no time.
INFLUENT98 Potential of public involvement	scaled 2 if accepts that can influence local and national decisions, 1 if accepts that can influence only local or national level decisions and 0 if non of the two influences are considered as possible.
MAXIMAL4 Support for maximal state	Average of four scales of agreement with the statements that the state should intervene for controlling prices , for reducing unemployment, for controlling press and for controlling political parties. Each item is scaled with -1 for “in a very little degree”, -0.5 “in a little degree”, 0 “DK”, 0.5 =in a high degree”, 1 “in a very high degree”. To be more expressive 100 multiply the average.
MINERS Support for the way miners acted in January 1999 during their rebellion movment	“ At the beginning of this year, in January, the miners from the Valley of Jiu left for Bucharest and followed clashes from Costesti and the agreement from Cozia. For the way the miners acted during these events, what grades would you assign them on a scale from 1 (very bad) to 10 (very good)?”
OPTIMISM Optimism	considers that one yer from now on will live 1 much wors... 5 much better
ORANT4 Entrepreneurial orientation	3 is entrepreneur, 2 intends to open a business but does bot have one, 1 would desire to open a business having much more money, 0 does not have , intends or desisere to open a business.
RELATII network capital	Index of NETWORK capital (RELATII), counting the number of “yes” to a set of six question asking if the person has connections to solve problems related to health, judiciary, administration, police, bank, job.
RELIGIOZITATE Religion attitude	Counting index of the intensity of religious attitude with values between 0 and three functions of the yes (1) or no (0) answers to the questions referring to the belief in life after death, heaven and doomsday judgment.

Variable label and name	Description of the variable
RISCAVER Aversion to risk	factor score of three items multiplied by 100: agreement with the statements that „customs are important as a guide in life”, „a well payed and unsure job is to be preferable to a sure but poor payed job”, „new thing are to be preferred to the old ones in life”
SDURATA Long term satisfaction	Index of temporal perception of life conditions built as factor score from SPREZENT, OPTIMISM, ACUMIERI
SPREZENT Satisfaction on present life conditions	scaled as to have -1 for very dissatisfied , -0.5 dissatisfied, 0 non-answer, 0.5 satisfied, 1 very satisfied

Table A 2. Operational definition of the main community/regional level variables

Variables	Measurement	
	level	year
DEVJUD98. Index of county development built in a different file with data for 40 counties of the country. Component variables are also indices of human capital, unemployment, material capital and general fertility rate at the county level (Sandu, 2000)	county	1998
QLIFEUR Level of development for the locality of residence (persons in the same locality got the same score) Factor score computed in a different file with data for each of the 2948 localities of the country with the variables: rate of out-migration, rate of infant mortality and rate of natality for the period 1994-1996. As natality is affected by the age structure was used its expected value function of percentage of more than 60 years old population in locality. For having a direct scaling the final factor score was multiplied by -1.	locality	1994-1996
DEVJUD95 Index of judet Development in 1995 computed as a factor score		
EUROPEAN Commune location close to an European road (1 yes, 0 no)		

Annex 2. Factor analyses

Table F 1. Factor structure of status space, 1998

	Factors		Communalities
	Regional-community development* COMREG98	Individual-family capital* CAPITAL98	
Urban residence (1 yes, 0 no)	0.80	0.18	0.67
locality development QLIFE/UR	0.79	0.04	0.62
county development DEVJUD	0.62	0.08	0.39
RELATII network capital	0.03	0.71	0.51
education	0.36	0.71	0.63
age	0.04	-0.67	0.45
BUNURI material capital	0.44	0.59	0.54
percent eigenvalues	37.89	16.68	

Data source: Public opinion barometer of Open Society Foundation BOP- FSD, 1998. Extraction with PCA and rotation with VARIMAX. * loading coefficients

Table F 2. Factor structure of status space, May 1999. Model 1

	Factors		Communalities
	Regional-community development* COMREG98	Individual-family capital* CAPITAL98	
Urban residence (1 yes, 0 no)	0.83	0.09	0.70
locality development QLIFE/UR	0.80	0.05	0.64
county development DEVJUD	0.60	0.01	0.37
BUNURI material capital	0.51	0.48	0.50
age	0.01	-0.73	0.55
RELATII network capital	-0.02	0.74	0.54
Education	0.47	0.60	0.58
percent eigenvalues	37.24	17.98	

Data source: Public opinion barometer of Open Society Foundation BOP- FSD, 1999. Extraction with PCA and rotation with VARIMAX. * loading coefficients

Table F 3. Factor structure of status space, May 1999. Model 2

	Factors		Communalities
	Dezvoltare comunitar-regională*	Consolidare capital individual-familial*	
Urban residence (1 yes, 0 no)	0.85	0.12	0.73
locality development QLIFE/UR	0.81	0.09	0.66
county development DEVJUD	0.56	0.13	0.33
RELATII network capital	-0.14	0.85	0.74
BUNURI material capital	0.42	0.63	0.57
Education	0.43	0.62	0.57
percent eigenvalues	41.70	18.13	

Data source: Public opinion barometer of Open Society Foundation BOP- FSD, 1999. Extraction with PCA and rotation with VARIMAX. * loading coefficients Factor rotation by OBLIMIN results in the same configuration of factors and the two factors correlate to the level 0.28. Model 1 1999 is constructed for comparability with the model using 1998 data. Model 2 1999 omits age, Factor structure is more simple than in model 1 meaning by it the it is easier to interpret the factors and there are no "impure" or composite variables with high loadings in the two factors.

Tabel F 4. Factor structure of transition ideologies

	Factors		Communalities
	Change ideologies*	Community ideologies*	
	SCHIMBARE	COMUNITATE	
Liberal orientation LIBERAL99	0.76	0.05	0.57
would vote for right oriented coalition of Democratic Convention CDR (1 yes, 0 no)	0.63	0.07	0.40
Support the statement that "only those taking risks can win" (1 yes, 0 no)	0.49	-0.15	0.27
is proud of being Romanian citizen (1 yes, 0 no)	-0.08	0.65	0.42
RELIGIOZITATE religious orientation	-0.11	0.64	0.42
generalized trust (factor score of interpersonal, order institutions and ethnic trust)	0.33	0.63	0.50
percent eigenvalues	23.31	19.82	

Data source: Public opinion barometer of Open Society Foundation BOP- FSD, 1999. Extraction and rotation methods are PCA and VARIMAX. KMO index is rather low of 0.55. The same data set analysed by maximum verosimiliy method for extraction of the factors results in the same factor structure, with a : $p=0.45$. A rotation by OBLIMIB give the same configuration of loadings by factors and a very small correlation between factors. * loading coefficients

Tabel F 5. The factor structure of the transition social space

	Factors		Communalities
	Modernity MODERNITATE	Resources RESURSE	
Durable satisfaction SDURATA	0.71	0.10	0.5
Modernity ideologies SCHIMBARE	0.69	0.23	0.49
Regional-community development COMREG	0.16	0.79	0.63
Capital stocks CAPITAL	0.51	0.72	0.69
Pro-community ideologies COMUNITATE	0.47	-0.53	0.58
Percent eigenvalue	34.37	23.45	

Data source: Public opinion barometer of Open Society Foundation BOP- FSD, 1999. Extraction and rotation methods are PCA and PROMAX. KMO index is rather low of 0.57. Structure matrix coefficients are noted in the table as correlations between factors and variables. PROMAX is an algorithm of rotation. Correlation between factors is of 0.14.

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