THE DYNAMICS OF SOCIAL SECURITY IN A PARTIAL REFORM EQUILIBRIUM SOCIETY: THE ROMANIAN CASE

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Reforms in the social area have been less evaluated in regard to their completeness. Do social reforms in their initial state create winner or loser groups? And if so, are these groups opposing further steps of reforms, leading to partial reform equilibriums, as many analyses of economic reforms assess? A brief institutional analysis provides evidence of the fact that those who gain from a partial reform state are the winners of incomplete economic reforms, while loses are supported rather uniformly by the whole population.

Stating the problem

The paper aims at highlighting the articulation processes in the field of social security in regard to the degree of completeness of initiated reforms. As most analyses of social policy in CEE countries have until recently contained to assessing the design and distributive impact of policies and programs, issues regarding the variables influencing institutional developments of social reforms have remained rather untouched. The present endeavor is directed towards assessing the appropriateness of the explicative model of of economic reforms for the social sector.

Adam Przeworski (1991) has been among the first authors who talked about the pitfalls of transition in the CEE countries. Before the transition period can show its advantages for the whole society, or for at least a critical number of groups, a 'grievance valley' has to be traversed; thus, transition will 'proceed in spurts'. His belief was that early losers of transition will become a significant brake of the reform processes[1]. Yet Hellman (1998) shows that the main risk of partial reforms lies not in the constituency of short-term losers but of short-term winners, which – under some circumstances – will oppose the continuation of the reform process. "(...) the politics of postcommunist economic reforms has not been dominated by the traditional short-term losers of economic transition – striking workers, resentful former state bureaucrats, impoverished pensioners, or armies of the unemployed. Instead, the most common obstacles to the progress of economic reform in postcommunist transitions have come from very different sources: from enterprise insiders who have become new owners only to strip their firms' assets; from commercial bankers (...); from local officials (...); and from so-called Mafiosi who have undermined the creation of a stable legal

[1] For a similar position see also Joan Nelson, The Politics of Economic Transformation: Is Third World Experience Relevant in Eastern Europe?, *World Politics* 45, 1993. Haggard and Kaufman (*The Political Eocnomy of Democratic Transition*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995) support this argument, while identifying two further political barriers to economic reforms in early democracies: the problem of collective action and the short time horizon of political decisions, given the short electoral cycles (156-158).

foundation for the market economy" (Hellman, 1998, 204). These groups are expected to strengthen their position and oppose further reforms, in a partial equilibrium model, where benefits become increasingly concentrated while overall social costs are dispersed. Accumulation of privileges, thus a concentration of benefits accompanied by an increase of overall costs, is responsible for delayed or partial reforms. Hellman (1998) shows that the depth of reforms is neither positively associated with the costs of the reforms nor with political tenure security, respectively executive turnovers. On the contrary, exactly those governments which have been more insulated from electoral pressures and had to fear least about popular reactions to high cost reforms became the 'laggards in the postcommunist economic transitions' (217). Not the increasing costs of partial reforms lead to organized opposition, but short time winners.

Hellman et al. (2000) conclude that the main short time winners of transition are newly privatized firms, small de novo firms and state owned enterprises. Capture firms[2] do exhibit more advantages within a high capture economy (as compared to a low capture country), accruing benefits under high corruption circumstances. In addition, influential firms[3] do exhibit increased gains from corruption in both high and low capture economies. For these firms it pays off to lobby against reforms, as long as further reforms can decrease their comparative advantages on the market and affect direct gains. Therefore, the story of transition is about how a few groups increase the costs of the many.

This paper aims at questioning the opportunity of tracing similar conclusions for the reforms within the field of social security. Are delays and partial social security reforms supported by some specific 'winner groups' or not? And if so, are these groups accruing privileges due to changes in the field of social protection or outside this area, in a broader economic environment? If opposing groups are constituted 'within' the field of social security, then continuing social reforms will inevitably lead to their dissolution. But if these groups are better of within a state of partial economic and political reform, then they will continue to parasite the social security system, decreasing its effectiveness and efficiency even after the completion of social reforms. Thus, the importance of this issue lies in the fact that it aims at identfying the variables influencing institutional developments within the social sector – during and after completion of reforms.

The first part will survey the evolution of social security in the transition period. The second part aims at identifying the winners within a partial equilibrium state and their status within the field of social security and within a broader economic context.

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[2] Those "firms which make private payments to public officials to affect the rule of the game" (Hellman et al., 2000, 3). Mostly, these firms tend to be *de novo* private firms or newly privatized firms.

[3] i.e "firms that have influence on (...) rules without recourse to private payments to public officials" (Hellman et al., 2000, 3). These are rather state-owned firms or firms with high percentage of state capital

Overall trends of reforms in social security

Social reforms have been carried out later in the 1990s allover the CEE, as most of these have been dependent upon the economy (Hausner, 2001; Nelson, 2001). These reforms are considered "usually 'second (or third) generation' reforms in the broad structural adjustment agenda" (Nelson, 2001, 236).

While social services developed slower, as they required not only a high involvement of local actors but also the emergence of expert systems and complex financial and accountability mechanisms, categorical monetary benefit schemes have been less problematic to design and reforms in this area have been more easily and widely accepted allover CEE (Nelson, 2001, 237). This is, for example, the case of the pension system as compared with health or educational services.

While most delays in reforms have been encountered in those social areas where policies are highly dependent upon the economy and costs are significantly high, their acceptance is easier and the consensus upon their implementation higher – under the sometimes high pressure of international agencies. As it became visible from the experience of almost all CEE countries, reforms of monetary social policies followed, up to a certain degree, a neo-liberal logic (Deacon, 1997, 91-103). These programs aimed at offering a minimal protection to recipients while containing to an austerity budget and reducing fiscal burdens as much as possible[4]. This has been also the case of Romania.

Even if with higher delays than most of the CEE countries, Romanian income maintenance policies slightly moved towards such measures.

Unemployment policy. The first major revision of the framework for social protection of unemployed, set out in the beginning of the 1990s, has been carried out only in 2001. Beginning with this year the period for which unemployment benefits are granted has been drastically limited and has been made dependent upon the number of years of contribution: from an initial 27 month of unemployment benefit (9 months) and unemployment allowance (a flat rated benefit granted for 18 months), to a period between 6 and 12 months, depending upon the number of years of contribution. Benefits have been flat rated at 60% of the legal minimum salary, as compared to the previous generous benefit of up to 85% of the last salary.

The pension system. A first major reform of the pension system, a classical contributory system since 1933, was undertaken in 2000. The 2000 law did not introduce any alternative pillar to the existing PAYG system; it only adjusted it. In this sense, Romania is one of the last countries in the CEE in respect to the pension reform. The benefit calculation formula has been changed such as to increase the proportionality with the whole period of contribution and to make the level of pensions more dependent upon performances of the

[4] On what makes the initiation of such rather unpopular reforms possible, both in western and in post-communist countries, see Kitschelt (2001).

economy. This measure substantially lowered pensions, at least for those to enter the system. Indexation systems[5] have been designed such as to decrease benefit inequality, by indexing with a higher percentage lower pensions and a lower percentage (or at all) higher pensions. Parental benefits for raising children up to the age of 2 have been flat rated, for parents with incomes higher than the national average salary.

Family benefits. The same trend is witnessed at the level of child and family benefits. At the moment there are discussions about targeting the universal child allowance (adopted in 1993 as a universalistic benefit). Another family benefit, for families with two and more children, adopted in the late '90's, has been already transformed in 2003 in an income-tested benefit. At the same time, a second family benefit has been adopted for single parent families, which has been as well designed – from the very beginning – as an income-tested benefit[6].

Thus, for most social benefits the average level decreased while either eligibility has been limited to, or benefits have been targeted on lower income deciles. There has been opposition to some of these developments, especially on behalf of trade-unions when it comes up to unemployment benefits. A series of voices rose against the flat rate benefit system, as contributions are related to income. Yet changes have been accepted and adopted[7], rather as a concession to the economy than due to their legitimacy. This reform direction leads to a peculiar form of redistributive social policy: *categorial benefits, double-checked by an income criteria, on the one hand, and insurance systems with social assistance traits, on the other hand.* While coverage has been restricted and benefits flat rated the social contributions and taxes maintained their high level[8] and continued to be proportional with the income level. On the other hand, pressure on social expenditure increased even more, as employment rate decreased and the number of pensioners and unemployed increased (see annex, graphic no. 5), while social expenditure did rather maintained its previous level (see annex, graphic no. 1, 2 and 3).

Overall low to moderate public social expenditure, a tendency towards means-tested benefit systems and a reduction in the average level of benefits are combined with high social contribution and taxes and a predominance of social insurance systems. This rather unpopular combination – of high net costs as compared to benefits – has been made possible – in the Romanian case – besides strong external influences also by the power hold by the government, as compared with the parliament or any other elected body. The number of

[5] Aimed at adjusting benefits to inflation

[6] Eligibility is limited to all those families which have per capita incomes lower than approximately half of the minim salary. This represents a higher threshold as that used for the means-tested social assistance benefit in Romania since 1995.

[7] sometimes under pressure of external actors

[8] In 2000, social contributions represented, on average, about 58% of the earned income (included are gross salaries and salary funds), as compared to OECD countries, for which in 2003 the highest social security contributions – paid jointly by employee and employer – did not exceed 39% (in the case of France, see OECD taxation database).

emergency ordinances has increased beginning with 1997 and outnumbered by far in 1999 – 2000 the number of laws adopted by the parliament in the field of social protection (see annex, graphic no. 8). Despite an apparently normalization in 2001 – 2002, the tendency towards governing trough emergency ordinances revived. On the other hand, the proportion of laws which sanction, respectively reject governmental ordinances is very high compared to the proportion of primary laws or adjustments to previous laws in all social sector areas (see annex, graphic no. 9). The power hold by central actors has been straightened as well by the low trust invested by the population in the parliament compared to any other institution.

But whatever the opportunities for undertaking unpopular reforms – be they external pressures or internal power balance – most of these reforms have been not yet completed. Pension reforms have not yet touched the delicate issue of a multi-pillar system; unemployment policies are not complete as the legislation in the field of work relations is still fluid and changing. Family benefits are not yet correlated with other form of benefits and tax exemptions or with major anti-poverty policies. Yet completion of reforms seems even harder than their initiation, as this second stage is more vulnerable to pressures and interests groups. Who are those winning within a partial social reform equilibrium state?

Accumulation of privileges and increasing benefits for certain groups: effects on the dynamic efficiency

Another particularity of the developments in the field of social cash-benefit systems – this time referring less to their distributive impact but to the articulation process itself – is the concentration of additional rights and privileges in some specific groups. Two categories of groups, which benefited of special treatment, have been identified[9]: one category attaining special rights and social benefits within the social protection system and a second category which, on the ground of a privileged position derived from partial economic and administrative reforms, benefited of massive arrears exempts and indirect subsidies (see Fig.1 below and table no.1 and 2 in the annex). The first category is composed of two types of groups: (potentially) influential political actors (e.g. military, employees in the industry supporting the national defense sector, miners, employees in monopolistic industries, police) and 'deserving' groups, which claimed restorative and compensatory policies (as war veterans, politically persecuted groups by the previously regime, 'new' revolutionaries

[9] The identification of the first category of groups has been made by an analysis of legislation. For example, during the period 1991-2003, almost half of the laws (i.e. 21 out of 46) passed in the field of social protection of unemployed has been dedicated to the groups identified in the diagram below. 18 laws regulating social security pensions have been dedicated to military pensioners and war veterans. While the second category of groups are the economic agents, who have been described by Hellman (1998) as winners from economic partial reforms (de novo firms and those with a majority of state capital) and who match the picture of arrears accumulation of firms by capital type (see annexes, table 1 and 2).

etc.). Both types of groups benefited of special treatment before and after the first major social policy revision in the beginning of 2000s'.The second category of 'winners' are those economic agents, identified by Hellman (1998) as those who usually win from a partial economic reform: either private firms or those with a majority state capital. Corruption permits to both these groups – private and state owned firms – to take advantage by either exercising their previously gained influence or buying off the 'rules of the game'.

Analyses of economic reforms show that accumulation of privileges is associated with delayed or partial reforms (for a detailed discussion see J. Hellman, 1998). These groups are expected to strengthen their position and oppose further reforms, in a partial equilibrium model, where benefits become increasingly concentrated while overall social costs become higher.



Figure 1. Groups which concentrated special privileges in the field of social protection during the '90s

A brief analysis of the legislation dedicated to the first category of groups, which gained special privileges in the field of social protection, does not confirm such a development. Despite the fact that an impressive part of the legislation during the last 14 years has been dedicated to these groups (see annex fig. 1, 2 and 3), the privileges and rights which they won are not significantly affected by the continuation of the reform. A good indicator is that benefit types for privileged pensioner groups have not significantly been changed by the first step of the pension reform in 2000. Maybe the most affected are future unemployed and the actual under-employed groups (see fig. 2 subcategory A) from the mining sector and those yet unreformed public utilities, for which the preservation of some privileges can become hard to negotiate (an exception are employees of public utility monopolies). Thus, the incentives to oppose reforms are rather low, as their 'privileged' position is less threatened by social reforms than by political and administrative ones. On the other hand, benefits granted to groups of the second sub-category – 'deserving groups' – transcend a specific field of social protection, while being extended from fiscal and entrepreneurial facilities to special insurance, categorical and social assistance benefits and services. Therefore, their interests are not related to a specific area or social policy. This fact decreases further the probability of opposing social reforms while rather opposing political ones, which could lower their overall influence power.

Interests in social security and unemployment legislation are mainly structured at the level of trade-unions and economic actors, some of the latter taking full advantage of an environment characterized by low law enforcement and doubtful procedural justice. Finally, the echoes of partial economic reforms, amplified by delays in administrative and social reforms, are those which 'count'. Economic agents, who benefit from partial economic reforms, are those who benefit as well from delayed reforms in the social sectors and administration. The major winners of partial reforms are state owned enterprises (or where the state is the principal stakeholder, with the majority capital), newly privatized enterprises, which negotiated privileges during the privatization stage (see IMF report on Romania, 2004), and, to some extent *de novo* private firms, which benefit from state capturing, in a high capture economy (see Hellman et al., 2000).

About half of the arrears in the Romanian economy, during the period 1995-2002, took the form of debts to the state budget and social insurance funds, whereas the highest debts can be observed in the private sector, followed by the mixed sector, where the state holds more than half of the capital (see annex, table no. 1 and 2). Most disciplined enterprises, from this point of view, are those with mixed capital, where the state holds less than 50%.

At the end of 2002, the debts of economic actors to the state budget reached 13,3 % of the GDP[10] while the debts to special social funds reached 5,8% of GDP (total debts, including debts to suppliers and banks, amounted 37,7% of the GDP). The mixed sector, with less than 50% state capital, had a very low contribution to this figures, the main debtors being the private and the majority state-hold enterprises. For example, the debts of economic agents to the National Health Social Insurance Fund at the end of 2002 represented 48% of the total expenditure made during the whole year by the Fund and 1,6% of the GDP (see table no. 3 in the annex).

Private and state firms are also those who engage in state capturing and influencing strategies, as these behaviors yield private benefits to firms in high capture economies (Hellman et al., 2000). Thus, opposition to any economic and administrative reform is more probable to come from these actors.

But what is the impact of these groups upon the developments in the field of social security? A first conclusion is that there is no strong evidence to support the statement that those who gain in terms of social protection[11] have the highest interests to oppose social reforms (as in the case of the economic reforms). Second, while delays of reforms of cash benefit programs are mostly due to incomplete economic reforms and they merely over-amplify the advantages of the winners of economic partial reforms, they increase overall costs for social protection therefore significantly affecting their prospects for sustainability. This is especially true as these developments are accompanied by the neo-liberal logic, to which most cash benefit programs submit. Low social benefits come to be bought more expensive by the majority of the population, as some very small groups preserve their privileges, disregarding the course of the reforms. Because contributions to social funds continue to remain high, alternative voluntary provision is practically excluded.

Thus, one of the most important consequences of the ongoing increase of overall net costs, in terms of sustainability of future institutional developments, is the lack of dynamic efficiency. The concept of dynamic efficiency is frequently used by economists to define sustainability. Dynamic efficiency is understood as a characteristic of an unfolding process of Pareto-improvements (Stavin et al., 2002), i.e. a sequence of decisions which allow for any type of welfare maximization as long as no one is affected on the spot, or in the long run. In the context of social policy dynamic efficiency requires social welfare maximization strategies which do not adversely affect effective 'social functioning' of individuals and communities. Therefore, an increase of costs accompanied by a decrease in coverage and/ or level of benefits leads to long

[10] In 2002 some of the existing social funds have been transferred under the administration of the Ministry of Finance and absorbed by the state budget. This is reflected also by the data on debts.

[11] In the form of direct benefits, special arrangements or tax exemptions

term monetary deprivation and diminishing chances of gaining basic capabilities for important segments of population.

Conclusion

The history of social sector reforms in transition seems more close to the initial position formulated in the early 1990s by Adam Przeworski. While there is no strong support for the opposite position – that winning groups of partial reforms are those which have the highest incentives to oppose further reforms (a position which seems to describe very well the politics of economic reforms)-, there is also too little evidence for supporting the statement that losers of partial social reforms are those who will oppose further reforms. A first conclusion is that the 'winner status' within the field of social protection is preserved by means of incomplete economic, political and administrative reforms. A second conclusion is that these winning groups, more than to oppose further social reforms, do increase the overall costs of anyway neo-liberal shaped social policies. Increased costs are not concentrated into certain 'losers' groups, therefore the chance to oppose reforms by certain groups is low. Low income groups do lose especially due to increased contributions while middle and high income groups from low protection (benefits) accompanied by decreasing opportunity of private provision of social protection. Rather, the main impact on the social sector developments can be described in terms of un-sustainability, as such evolutions affect negatively the dynamic efficiency of the policy articulation process. The long term consequences of delayed reforms in the social sector seem more important than in the case of economic reforms. While economic recovery is dependent upon 'now and here' policies, social welfare is rather dependent upon long term, sustainable policies.

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Annex



Data source: Romanian Statistical Yearbook 2003, National Institute for Statistics

Graphic 1. Romania - Social public expenditure as a % of GDP, 1990-2002



Data source: Romanian Statistical Yearbook 2003, National Institute for Statistics

Graphic 2



Data source: Romanian Statistical Yearbook 2003, National Institute for Statistics

Graphic 3. Romania Social security and social assistance expenditure as a % of GDP, 1991-2002



Data source: Romanian Statistical Yearbook 2003, National Institute for Statistics
Note: beginning with 1999, the average monthly social insurance pension for non-farmers includes as well the supplementary pension

Graphic 4. The real dynamics of the monthly average social insurance pension, as compared to 1990 (1990 – 2002)



Data source: Romanian Statistical Yearbook 2003, National Institute for Statistics

Graphic 5. Romania - social insurance dependency rates (in %), 1990-2002



Data source: Romanian Statistical Yearbook 2003, National Institute for Statistics

Graphic 6. Romania - the real dynamics of minimum salary, as compared to 1995, 1995-2002



Data source: Romanian Statistical Yearbook 2003, National Institute for Statistics
Note: in 1997, the benefit included also some compensation of increase in bread prices

Graphic7a. Romania - Monthly average unemployment benefit, as a % of the minimum salary, 1991 -2002



Data source: Romanian Statistical Yearbook 2003, National Institute for Statistics
Note: in 1997, the benefit included also some compensation of increase in bread prices, and in the 2002 other form of unemployment support is included in this figure

Graphic 7b. Romania, real dynamic of the unemployment benefit, as a % of its 1991 value



Data source: Deputy Chamber, Romanian Parliament, www.cdep.ro (legislative database)

Graphic 8. Romania - The dynamics of governmental (emergency) ordinances and laws in the field of social policy, 1990-2003



Data source: Deputy Chamber, Romanian Parliament, www.cdep.ro, (legislative database)

Graphic 9. Romania - Number of laws in the social field by type, 1990-2003



Figure 1. Romanian Legislation in the field of social protection of unemployed, 1990-2003



Figure 2. Romanian legislation in the field of social security, 1990 -2003

Table 1. Arrears of Romanian Enterprises to state social funds, as a % of GDP, 2000-2003

	Dec. 2000	Dec. 2001	Dec. 2002	June 2003
National economy	3.9	5.2	5.8	5.3
Private sector	1.2	1.4	1.7	1.8
State sector (50% - 100% state ownership)	2.4	3.4	3.8	3.3
Mixed, with state share < 50%	0.2	0,3	0.3	0.3

Data source: Romania: Selected Issues and Statistical Appendix, IMF, European Department, 2004

Table 2. Arrears of Romanian enterprises 1995-2002, as a % of GDP

	Private sector							
	1995	*1996*	*1997*	*1998*	*1999*	*2000*	*2001*	*2002*
	8.14	14.28	13.24	15.60	19.52	17.71	19.28	20.98
Suppliers	4.51	7.60	7.62	8.50	9.65	8.88	10.27	10.18
Other creditors	2.28	2.40	2.16	2.53	3.67	4.14	4.60	3.69
Banks	0.83	2.12	2.29	3.00	4.21	2.24	1.67	1.55
State budget	0.52	1.32	1.18	1.57	1.99	2.45	2.75	5.57
	Mixed with state ownership under 50%							
	1995	*1996*	*1997*	*1998*	*1999*	*2000*	*2001*	*2002*
	0.81	1.37	2.47	2.80	4.38	4.73	3.83	3.77
Suppliers	0.63	0.83	1.46	1.67	2.61	3.22	2.57	0.78
Other creditors	0.07	0.15	0.49	0.34	0.87	0.82	0.70	0.38
Banks	0.03	0.18	0.16	0.34	0.44	0.34	0.27	0.33
State budget	0.07	0.22	0.37	0.45	0.46	0.35	0.29	2.27
	State ownership: over 50% but under 100%							
	1995	*1996*	*1997*	*1998*	*1999*	*2000*	*2001*	*2002*
	1.29	5.99	7.66	7.82	9.66	*8.06*	*4.40*	*3.30*
Suppliers	0.54	2.31	2.47	2.34	2.35	1.64	0.92	1.88
Other creditors	0.22	1.10	2.02	1.70	2.34	2.88	1.66	0.37
Banks	0.26	1.14	1.76	1.50	1.27	0.88	0.53	0.22
State budget	0.34	1.45	1.81	2.28	3.70	2.67	1.30	0.82
	Integral state ownership							
	1995	*1996*	*1997*	*1998*	*1999*	*2000*	*2001*	*2002*
	14.71	14.30	10.28	9.83	8.57	9.91	8.17	9.52
Suppliers	7.61	2.57	3.53	2.68	3.40	3.95	2.79	3.82
Other creditors	0.97	3.22	1.92	2.18	2.55	2.44	2.88	0.83
Banks	1.99	1.94	1.59	1.22	0.52	0.43	1.10	0.30
State budget	4.13	3.87	3.24	3.75	2.11	3.09	1.40	4.57
	National economy							
	1995	*1996*	*1997*	*1998*	*1999*	*2000*	*2001*	*2002*
	25.15	36.07	33.74	36.15	42.22	40.48	35.76	37.70
Suppliers	13.35	16.05	11.92	15.22	18.02	17.71	16.55	16.67
Other creditors	3.57	6.90	6.21	6.78	9.46	10.31	9.88	5.34
Banks	3.12	6.22	5.81	6.06	6.44	3.89	3.57	2.41
State budget	5.11	6.89	6.62	8.08	8.29	8.57	5.75	13.27

Data source: www.fmi.ro; statistical annex, table 10, Romania: Selected Issues and Statistical Appendix, IMF, European Department, 2004

Note:
1) Other creditors include debts with salaries and contribution to various social insurance funds
2) Data for 1995 are under evaluated due to the cancelling of some arrears through the FESAL program
In 2002 some of the social funds have been absorbed by the state budget and this shift is reflected by the sudden increase of debts to the state budget

Table 3. Romania - Expenditure and debts of and to the Health Social Insurance Fund, 2002

Total expenditure from the Health Social Insurance Fund, as a % of the GDP	**3.20%**
Hospital debts	
total debts of hospitals, as a % of the total expenditure from the Health Social Insurance Fund	**19.02%**
total debts of hospitals, as a % of GDP	**0.61%**
Total debt of hospitals which can not be covered from the Health Social Insurance Fund, as a % of the total debts	**53.42%**
Debts to the Health Social Insurance Fund	
Debts of economic agents to the Health Social Insurance Fund, as a % of the total expenditure form the Health Social Insurance Fund	**48.85%**
Debts of economic agents to the Health Social Insurance Fund, as a % of GDP	**1.56%**

Data source: Annex 3,6,10 Annual Report of the National Health Social Insurance House, www.cnas.ro