

GENDER VALUES DYNAMICS: TOWARDS A COMMON EUROPEAN PATTERN?

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The paper aims to analyze the dynamics of gender values during the nineties in the European countries. In the context of the changing economic, social, political, and cultural contexts, the gender values are shifting from the traditionalist ones to modern and postmodern ones. The paper tries to explore how the gender values have evolved during the last decade in the Western and Eastern Europe under the influences cultural, economic, political, and socio-demographic of factors. I employ longitudinal analysis performed on the data provided by two waves of European Values Survey (1990 and 1999). The EVS data indicates that Europe tends to a common model of gender equality. In the Western countries, the changes produced by the shift from the industrial to post-industrial society are simultaneous with a cultural move from modern to post-modern culture. The Eastern Europe knows a similar trend under the impact of the globalization and the 'Europeanization'. The latent pattern of the new European society supports the equal involvement for women and men in the paid labour and a new division of gender roles within the household.

The paper aims to analyze the dynamics of gender values during the nineties in the European countries. In the context of the changing economic, social, political, and cultural contexts, the gender values are shifting from the traditionalist ones to modern and postmodern ones. The shifting of gender values on the axis traditionalism – modernism – postmodernism is linked, on the one hand, with the cultural shift that occurred during the last decades, and with the socioeconomic transformation, on the other hand. As Inglehart (1997) points out, the relation between the cultural and socioeconomic changes is a reciprocal one, because the “major socioeconomic changes reshape the culture” and “through processes of random mutation and natural selection, culture adapts to a given environment” (p. 59). Therefore, the changing of the gender values process has multiple determinants, being influenced by cultural, economic, political, and socio-demographic factors. The paper tries to explore how the gender values have evolved during the last decade in the Western and Eastern Europe under the influences of these various factors. I employ longitudinal analysis performed on the data provided by two waves of EVS (1990 and 1999).

The first part of the paper summarizes the main approaches that I used. The second part is dedicated to the data analysis. The last part contains comments regarding the findings and conclusions.

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Modernization, postmodernization and gender values

The transformation of the gender values is a part of a broader pattern of culture shift for the Traditional culture to the Modern and Postmodern culture. The Traditional cultural pattern has emphasized the values of the religious authority and the belonging to the local community and to the family. The traditional culture has encouraged different roles for men and women and the inequality between the members of the family: woman, the housewife, has fewer rights and was depending to the male breadwinner. The more insecure pre-industrial society imposed the family as mandatory for the children survival, and therefore it has emphasized the childbearing and the childrearing as central goals for women (Inglehart, Norris, 2003).

The social modernization came together with the industrialization, urbanization and with the decreasing of the role of the religious authority at the society level. The traditional authority was replaced by the legal – rational authority. The industrialization brought an increased need for labour force and therefore a higher women involvement on the labour market. This determined a change of the gender roles and consequently a redistribution of the roles within the household. On the other hand, the institutions of the Welfare State have partially freed the women from the burden of caring for children and elderly. As a result, the industrial society is quite different form the preindustrial one with the regard of the gender roles and the gender values.

Easter, Halman and de Moor (1993) indicate that ‘the modernization processes offer opportunities to develop new societal values such as personal freedom, self-development, self-expression, creativity, equality and democracy’ (pp. 8). On the other hand, the cultural modernization does not offer only the opportunity to develop new kinds of values, but it also generates new processes in the construction of the individual value systems. Among these processes one can mention the fragmentation of the value systems and their individualization. According to Easter, Halman and de Moor (1993), individualization represents ‘the process in which values, beliefs, attitudes and behaviour are increasingly based on personal choice and are less dependent on tradition and on social institution’ (p. 7). Consequently, the values involved in gender relations become more equalitarian and less dependent on the traditional pattern of the family relations. As Giddens (1998) indicates, ‘the democratization in the context of family implies equality, mutual respect, autonomy, decision-making through communication and freedom from violence’ (p. 93). In this context, people are more and more willing to support values that underpin the new gender division within the family, a higher involvement of men in the domestic work, an increased participation of women at the labour market and a greater need of women for self-development and self-expression.

Talking about the modernization and postmodernization impact on the

gender values, Inglehart and Norris (2003) distinguish two stages in the process of values' change. The first stage corresponds to the industrialization process which brings women into the paid labour force and dramatically decreases the fertility rate. This stage is related to the decline of the traditional family and consequently to the decline of values which sustain the traditional type of family. The second phase is the postindustrial one. It brings a shift towards greater gender equality, women being more and more involved in the management or in the political processes. According to this approach, the first stage set free women from the gender relations of the traditional family, while the second established the equality between sexes at the societal level.

However, the process of passing from the industrial society to the postindustrial one is simultaneous with a more complex social and cultural shift, known as the shift from the Modern society and culture towards Postmodern ones. As Inglehart (1997) points out, Modernization and Postmodernization 'are strongly linked with the economic development, but Postmodernization represents a late stage of development that is linked with very different beliefs from those that characterize Modernization' (p. 8). The Postmodernization changes the values pattern in the domains of politics, religion, work, family life. The process tends to replace the values of homogeneity and universalism with those of institutionalized pluralism, with variety and with ambivalence (Mullard, Spiker, 1998, p. 130). The Postmodern culture encourages the diversity and the differences. It emphasizes the individualization and the fragmentation of the individual value systems.

One of the core value shifts in the process of changing culture from the Modern to the Postmodern society is the shift from the Materialist towards the Postmaterialist values, described by Inglehart (1977, 1990, 1997). People socialized in the societies with a higher degree of affluence and security are less disposed to support materialist values, like economic achievement, accumulation of the material resources and economic security, are willing more to share Postmaterialist values, like the need for self-expression, self-actualization and the concern for the quality of life. The high degree of affluence, which has characterized many of the Western industrialized nations during the last decades, has produced a shift in the values orientation of the population, from the Materialist towards the Postmaterialist values. This shift has affected especially the younger cohorts, which have been socialized during this period of affluence. As far as gender values are concerned, the shift from Materialist to Postmaterialist values means an increased support for self-realization of the women and a change in their representation: from the image of the mother and the housewife to that of an independent, working person (Inglehart, 1997). Therefore, one can say that the new generations, socialized after the Second World War, are much willing to support the Postmaterialist values and to give priority to the gender equality and to the role of women as

employees, then the older generations are.

As I have pointed out before, between the cultural change and the socioeconomic one there is some interdependency. The change of values affects and is affected by the socioeconomic changes. I will consider here only some factors that have influenced the dynamic of gender values during the last decade, like the development of a commune legislative framework at the European Union level, the transformations of the Welfare State and the dynamic of the labour market.

The development of the European Union in the last decade has had a significant impact on the dynamic of gender values. Not only the free exchange of information among European states, but also the tentative made in order to provide a common legislative framework have had an influence on gender values. The relation between the values shared by the population and legislation promoted by a specific political regime is mediated by the concept of legitimacy. In order to be legitimate a regime has to establish a set of values concordant with those shared by the majority. Thereby, one can affirm there is a correspondence that between the type of promoted policies at one moment in time and the values shared by the population (Voicu, 2003). Therefore, the gender policy promoted by the EU influences and is influenced by the individual values systems.

In the first stage of the development of a European common legislation, the main concern was to assure the equal payment for women and men for equal labour. According to Haintras (1995) the main goal was not to promote the gender equality, but to ensure the equal competition on the international labour market. Stratigaki (2000) identified a second stage in the evolution of the EU common gender policy, during the '90. The core objective of this stage was to ensure equal treatment on the labour market for both sexes and to promote the reconciliation between career and family life. Thus, the policy of the last decade has strongly support the shift from the traditional gender values towards the equalitarian model in work and family life.

However, Haintras (2000) indicates that the EU members have joined the Union having "differentiated set of interests and expectations, in terms of its political culture and policy environment, which have influenced the approach of gender issues at supranational level" (p. 19). In this context, the policy measures promoted by the EU have had different impact on the mass values orientations, depending on the local political culture and on the local socio-economic background. Consequently, we expect to find different evolutions in the dynamic of gender values, under the impact of the European common legislation, depending on this background. On the other hand, the introduction of a similar legislation within the member states provides the opportunity to encourage what Easter, Halman and de Moor (1993) named 'values convergence'. Let also note that the values convergence occurs in a world of

cultural diversity.

During the last two decades the Western Welfare State has experienced a lot of transformations under multiple constraints. The Welfare State crisis from the '70 imposed the need of rethinking the structure and the function of the Welfare State. Different states have answered differently to the challenges of the welfare crisis. Taylor-Gooby (1996) identifies three types of answers, among which the reorienting of the requests for welfare provision to other social actors than the state, like the market, the family and the local community. This has a direct impact on the gender values, especially in the countries in which the state provides little help in caring for the children and elderly and the burden for caregiving belongs almost exclusively to the women, like in the case of the Southern countries. Consequently, the retrenchment of the state means a supplementary burden for women and fewer chances for changing the individual value systems towards more gender equality.

On the other hand, the evolutions of the welfare concept and the debate around the welfare in the last years, place in the core of the political debate a new conception about welfare. The new welfare concept is adapted to the social, cultural and economic changes produced in the post-industrial society. According to Giddens (1994) and to Mullard and Spiker (1998), in the post-traditional society people seek to find the autonomy and the self-expression and, therefore, the new concept of welfare (*positive welfare* promoted by the *generative welfare state*) should have as core the autonomy and the free choice of the individuals. In this context, the values of gender equality in work and family life is one of the core elements of the new welfare state, being promoted and sustained by the new political and social movements.

The dynamic of the labour market is also important for the present analysis. In the last decades women became more economically active and much more involved on the labour market. In some Western European countries, like The Netherlands, Germany, United Kingdom, the female participation on the labour market has increased in the last decades and this increase took place mainly on the basis of the part-time employment (O'Connor, 1996). On the other hand, some studies have indicated a decreasing in the participation in the labour market of the people above 50 years old (Taylor-Gooby, 1999). Therefore, there is a likelihood that elderly people will be less supportive towards the women involvement on the labour market, because they are much more vulnerable to the unemployment and women represent a rival on the labour market. Moreover, Davis and Robinson (1996) hypothesize that 'men with less prestigious occupations or low incomes may tend to view women as a threat in competition for jobs' (p. 207). Thus, one can assume that men above 50 years old are less supportive towards the new gender values.

Alt (1979) points out that the generosity and the altruism are increasing with the personal well-being. During crisis, people will reject the policies that

advantage others, displaying more support for the policies which are in their own benefit. I am expecting that during the crisis periods, like an increase in unemployment, people, especially those vulnerable to unemployment, are less willing to support women involvement on the labour market and the values of gender equality. One can assume that the increase in unemployment will be associated with a decrease in the support for the values of gender equality.

The above assumptions could be formulated for both Western and Eastern European countries. However, in the ex-communist case, some important differences might occur. The culture shift from Traditionalism to Modernism and Postmodernism knows different stages. The impact of common legislation of the EU is different too. The dynamic and the structure of labour market have particular features in the ex-communist states, due to the transition from the planned economy to the free market.

The communist project was a modernization one. However, the transition from the pre-industrial to the industrial society was a forced one, imposed by the external forces of the state. The Eastern European countries did not experience 'the gradual disintegration of the traditional society which facilitated the individualization in its Western counterparts' (van der Broek, de Moor, 1993). From the bureaucratization, centralization and secularization point of view, 'the socialist state represented the culmination of Modernization' (Inglehart, 1997, p. 97), but, from the value patterns point of view, the ex-communist societies are unequally modernized. According to van der Broek and de Moor, if religious and political values are concerned, there are smaller differences between Eastern and Western population, but, in the domain of the work or of the primary relations, the Eastern societies are more traditional than the Western ones.

Following different approaches of the post-communist societies, Voicu (2001) labels the Romanian society as a *pseudo-modern society*, 'a society of a strained, dilemmatic and infirm modernity, which is oscillating between tradition and postmodernity' (p. 51). The modernization project was a hollow one, such as it was imposed and not negotiated, and it was lacking civil participation. At the end of the eighties, this half-modern society found itself in deep crisis. The traditionalist regress answered the crisis simultaneous with the post-modern influences due to contact with the Western societies. At a general level, this is more or less valid for all the ex-communist societies. Thus, the Eastern societies are a mixture of traditionalism, modernism and postmodernism, some domains being modern and other still traditional, some segments of the population being traditionalist and other oriented towards postmodernism. During the first decades after the Second World War, most of the Central and Eastern European countries have experienced a period of the economic growth and of relative economic security, due to the industrialization, urbanization and to the economic boom which has characterized the period. As

a consequence, some parts of the generations socialized during '60 and '70 are more inclined to share the Postmaterialist values. On the other hand, the economic recessions of the '80 and the greater decline, in terms of economic security and of quality of life during the transition period, have determined a shift from the Postmaterialist values to the Materialist ones. In addition, Mason (1995) shows that the materialist values prevail over the Postmaterialist ones in the region.

In the domains of gender roles and gender values the things are also different than in the Western part of the continent. The implementation of the communist project needed a quite numerous labour force and, therefore, the communist governments have encouraged the women to enter into the paid employment. Although the women involvement into the working force was quite high, the communist state did not take measures aimed to encourage the sharing of the domestic work between partners (Lohkamp – Himmighofen, Dienel, 2000). In addition, the communist ideology has stated the equality among all the citizens, and consequently between men and women.

Even if, at the declarative level, the gender equality was reached in the Eastern countries, in effect gender values were and are much traditional than in many Western countries. First of all, for the inhabitants of the Eastern Europe 'gender equality was a goal that was imposed from above, rather than one chosen and fought for by the women themselves during the communist era' (Wolchik, 1998, p. 292). As a consequence, the population did not completely internalized the values imposed by an external and not fully legitimated power. Secondly, the former communist regime did not support the sharing of the domestic work and replacement of the traditional gender roles within the family, with the modern ones, as we have indicated before. In this context, Eastern European countries score low that the many Western countries do on the household modernity dimension (Voicu, 2003).

During the transition, the greater economic insecurity determines a regress to the materialist values orientation, which would affect the gender values too. Moreover, the increased unemployment has affected the female participation on the labour market, but the high economic insecurity pushed them into the labour force, because their households need a second income. Gal and Klingman (2000) indicate that the opinion polls show that most women from the region are willing to work for salary even if they do not need money. However, in the Eastern Europe, during the last decade, in the context of greater job insecurity, it is quite probable to find a decreasing in values of gender equality.

On the other hand, during the transition period the state involvement in providing the support for families and especially for women has significantly decreased. The post-communist states have encouraged the deinstitutionalization in childcaring and they support the stronger family

involvement in childrearing (UNICEF, 1999). This trend towards deinstitutionalization is stronger in conservative post-communist countries like Bulgaria, Romania and Poland. Here the use of daily childcare facilities has decreased during the transition (van Dijk, 2001). Thus, these states have thrown the burden of caring for children on the family and the main carrier of this burden, according to the traditional family pattern, are the women. In this context, it is quite probable that the support for women involvement on the labour market to decrease.

The present analysis is focused on the dynamic of two gender values: the equality of women and men on the labour market and the gender equality within household. The first dimension refers to value orientations toward the equal access of women and men in the labour market. We have called it *equal labour*. It becomes manifest through an increase acceptance of the women as an employee and through the rejection of the housekeeper – breadwinner model. The second dimension, labeled as *household modernity*, refers to the representation of the household role division, with special focus on the traditional childcare role of woman.

According to the above theoretical developments, one can expect that:

- (1) The dynamic of gender values is different in Eastern and Western countries, due to the dominant cultural pattern in the society and to the socio-economic context. Therefore, we expect to find an increase in equal labour and household modernity in the Western societies and a decrease in equal labour in Eastern countries. The household modernity rest at the same values in the ex-communist countries.
- (2) The support for gender equality (measured on two dimensions, namely household modernity and equal labour) is increasing during the '90 for all the age groups.
- (3) The support for gender equality (household modernity and equal labour) has a different dynamic depending on sex. The increasing in support for gender values is higher for women than for men.

Data

In analysis the dynamic of gender values during the last decade in the European countries, I have used data provided by the last two waves of EVS, 1990 and 1999. I have included in the analysis only the data for the countries which are presented in both waves and which allowed longitudinal analysis for each country². I have identified two values dimensions regarding gender

² The countries included in the analysis are: France, United Kingdom, West and East Germany, Italy, Spain, Portugal, The Netherlands, Belgium, Denmark, Sweden, Finland, Iceland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, The Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Slovenia. I have excluded Ireland, North Ireland and

relations, in the EVS data sets, the same as in the theoretical model (*equal labour* and *household modernity*). The dimension labeled household modernity refers to the gender equality within household, while the dimension called equal labour refers to equal access on the labour market. The latent variable that underpin the first dimension explains the variation of the variables: 'Working mother can establish just as warm and secure a relationship with her children as a mother who does not work'; 'Pre-school child is likely to suffer if his or her mother works'; 'Job is alright but what most women really want is a home and children'; 'Being a housewife is just as fulfilling as working for pay'. Thus, those people who score high on this dimension approve less the idea that mothers provide the best childrearing and that the main satisfactions for women are providing by housekeeping and childrearing. The latent value that underlines the equal labour dimension explains the variation of the following variables: 'Working mother can establish just as warm and secure a relationship with her children as a mother who does not work'; 'Having a job is the best way for a woman to be an independent person'; 'Both the husband and wife should contribute to household income'. The people who score high on this dimension support more the idea that men and women are equal with the respect to labour market involvement.

The confirmatory factor analysis was firstly run for the 1990 data set. Maintaining constant the loadings, the analysis was run again for the 1999 data set. The analysis was also rerun for each country included in the data set for 1990 and 1999 waves. Each time the loadings were maintained constant, as they have resulted from the first analysis (for the entire data set from 1990)³. The coefficients for each wave and each country are presented in the Annex 1. They confirm that the factorial structure remain the same for the two wave and for each country. The factorial structure is presented below, in Diagram 1.


Graphical indicates that the Household modernity has increased in all the European countries, which are in the analysis, excepting Finland. Therefore, one can say than the Europeans are much modern with the respect to the gender roles division within household, that they were a decade ago. The trend is similar with those predicted in the hypothesis for the Western European countries. Under the impact of the cultural changes which characterizes the post-industrial societies, people become much willing to support a redistribution of gender roles within the household. Although I have expected to find a stagnation of the household modernity for the Eastern Europe countries, due to the social and economic transformation, the data indicates that people from the region became more supportive for a new division of the gender role in the


Austria from the analysis because they have used a different scale for answers in 1999 and the data they have collected is not comparable with the data provided by the other countries.

³ The goodness of fit indexes for the entire set of data, for 1999 wave are: $\chi^2 = 1365.528$ ($\nu = 7$), $\Delta 2IFI = 0.997$, $RMSEA = 0.075$


family.

Diagram 1. Factorial structure of the gender values





Graphic 1. The variation of Household modernity between 1990 and 1999



Graphic 2. The variation of Equal labour between 1990 and 1999

The second dimension, related with the women's and men's equal access on the labour market, apparently has a quite different dynamics from that predicted in the hypothesis. I have expected to find an increasing in equal labour dimension for the Western countries and a decreasing for the Eastern ones. In fact, for all the Eastern countries, with the exception of Romania, there was an increasing in support for equal involvement in labour for both sexes. One can say that the population of Eastern Europe became more equalitarian with the respect of gender role. On the other side, not all the inhabitants of Western countries are much inclined to sustain gender equality on the labour market then they was 10 years ago. In countries like Portugal, United Kingdom, Iceland and Finland, the gender equality is in decline. However, analyzing the levels of signification of the differences between means (the t test), one can note that the relatively small differences in the case of Iceland, Denmark, Spain, Slovenia, Romania and Italy are not statistically significative ($p=0,05$). Also, the UK decrease is very smooth in relative terms (reported to the 1990's values), while the increase for the Netherlands, Belgium, Germany and France are quite important.

Summing up, the Western Europe, as a whole, knows an increase in supporting women involvement on the labor market. The individual (country) increases are important for the continental Western Europe, while the few decreases are not significative or very slight (in the UK case). Finland and, especially, Portugal display a completely different behavior with huge decreases. I suspect for Portugal problems in gathering data.

The surprising findings for the ex-communist countries are probably related with several factors. Cultural exchanges with the western democracies, the legislative changes imposed by the EU for the accession countries are among them. As I will show in the following sections, it seems that the values imposed by the communist regime were stronger for the older people. The contagion phenomena, in the contact with western values, strengthen them, even if they were imposed by a not entirely legitimated regime. On the other hand, despite the general increase of unemployment, the situation is not necessary defined by the East-Europeans as a crisis one. Some of these societies escaped from the suzerainty of another state, and freed themselves. All of them perceived freedom as a new gain. For many of them, the end of the nineties meant a higher level of income than during the communist regime (see World Bank, 2002). Romania is the exception and this could be seen in the Graphic 1. Finally, as the starting point for those countries was lower, they had the possibility to increase more than the Western societies their support for equal labor.

Looking to the evolution of the two gender values in Eastern and Western countries, one can say that the general tendency in Europe is to a common model. If household modernity is concerned, in almost all the European

countries its level has increased in the last ten years. Taking into account the initial level of household modernity in 1990 (see Graphic 2.2, Annex 2), one can say that the increasing in this dimension depends on its initial level. Countries which have scored lower in 1990 have a greater increase than those which score higher. The same finding is valid for the other dimension – Equal labour (see Graphic 2.1 – Annex 2). The greater the initial level of the variable, the slighter is the increasing in the last decade.

Table 1. Changes in Household modernity and Equal labour by cohorts and region (West – East)

Cohorts	Household modernity				Equal labour			
	West		East		West		East	
	1990	1999	1990	1999	1990	1999	1990	1999
1900-1909	2,45	2,57	1,85	2,54	-2,60	-2,57	-2,34	-2,12
1910-1919	2,56	2,59	2,25	2,60	-2,59	-2,58	-2,24	-2,19
1920-1929	2,64	2,72	2,33	2,74	-2,45	-2,39	-2,29	-2,23
1930-1939	2,90	2,98	2,29	2,72	-2,41	-2,38	-2,33	-2,16
1940-1949	3,19	3,25	2,50	2,77	-2,39	-2,26	-2,27	-2,16
1950-1959	3,40	3,46	2,59	2,86	-2,36	-2,31	-2,34	-2,20
1960-1969	3,50	3,53	2,77	2,88	-2,32	-2,32	-2,33	-2,25
1970-1979	3,45	3,52	2,80	3,01	-2,24	-2,25	-2,22	-2,31
1980-1989	-	3,72	-	3,03	-	-2,25	-	-2,22

Table 1 partially supports the second hypothesis. According to the data, the support for Household modernity has increased in both Eastern and Western Europe for all the cohorts. The changing is quite small for the inhabitants of Western countries, but is quite significant for the East Europeans (see also Annex 3- Graphic 3.1 and 3.2). Moreover, for Eastern Europe, the changes are more important for the older cohorts than for the youngest ones. For 1999, the level of Household modernity is quite the same for all the cohorts in Eastern Europe, while in West the younger are significantly much supportive to the model of gender roles within family. Even so, to general level, the support for new gender roles is superior in Western societies, but the general trend is an increasing one in East. One can say that under the pressure of cultural and legislative factors, people who live in post-communist societies become more supportive for the redistribution of the gender roles in household. They adapt their value systems to the new cultural and social context.

With the respect of Equal labour dimension, the situation is different in West and East (see also Annex 3 – Graphics 3.3 and 3.4). In Western countries there is an increasing in support for equal participation to labour market for ‘adult’ cohorts (those born between 1940-1949 and 1950-1959) and stagnation for the younger ones. One can say that the population of these countries tends to

a common, uniform model, with the respect to women participation on the labour market. The younger generations have reached the 'optimum' level of gender equality on the labour market earlier and now, the adult cohorts change slowly their orientation in the same direction.

In Eastern Europe, there is a tendency in increasing the Equal labour dimension for all the cohorts, excepting the youngest one (people born between 1970 and 1979). The Graphic 3.3 (see Annex 3) indicates that the support, for equal participation on labour market for men and women, decreases on the same time with the age. The younger generations are less supportive for the women involvement on the paid work, both comparing with the older cohorts and with their own position ten years ago. Probably, the support decreased due to the economic difficulties produced by the transition period. The new context of amplified economic and social insecurity, people become less willing to support women involvement on the labour market. The transition has created an optimum context for the expansion of traditional gender stereotypes.


A deeper analysis, that takes into account not only the cohort, but also the sex of respondent, indicates that in Eastern Europe the men display a different pattern with respect to the dynamic of Equal labour dimension. Graphic 3 shows that the younger men from post-communist countries are less disposed to support women involvement on the labour market than the older cohorts are. Moreover, the youngest cohort of men included in the analysis is less willing to sustain equal access for both sexes to paid employment than it was a decade ago. Their support decreased due to the economic difficulties of transition period. The younger cohorts of men and women are much affected by the unemployment comparing with the older ones and as Alt pointed out, the altruism decreased during the crisis period. Therefore, young women and men are competing on the same scarce resource in Eastern Europe – the working places. In this context, men are less willing to give equal chances for women on the labour market, instead they prefer to sustain the un-involvement of female work force on the paid employment. More, for these cohorts, the educational status of men and women is more similar, so they compete on the same labor markets.

The dynamic of the other dimension – Household modernity – is the same for men in Western and in Eastern Europe (see Graphics 3.5 and 3.6 – Annex 3). There is a rising in Household modernity for men in all cohorts in both parts of Europe. Even if this tendency is that predicted by the hypothesis, the level of changes is different in East and West. The transformation is much higher to the Eastern male population than to the Western one. The differences in Household modernity are very small, if male population of Western Europe is concerned. One can say that the trend is almost the same in both parts of Europe, but the changes are sharper in the post-communist countries. Furthermore, the dynamic of the Equal labour dimension is different for the two categories of male


population. For Western Europe the trend is similar with those predicted (see Graphic 4): there is an increase for all the cohorts excepting the younger ones. For the later the value orientation on women involvement on the labour market stagnates.

If the women's value orientations are concerned, the trends of variation for Household modernity are similar for Eastern and Western Europe (see Graphics 3.9 and 3.10 – Annex 3). Although the new model of gender roles in family is more sustained in both parts of continent and for all the age groups, the variation is somewhat higher in East, than in West. Western women have changed less this value orientation in the last decade than the Eastern women did. These ones become more oriented to a new division of the gender roles in family for all the age groups, but the level of the analyze dimension is still under that of women from Western Europe.

With respect to Equal labour, the differences between women from Western and Eastern Europe are rather small. One can observe an increase in support for female involvement in paid work in both sides of Europe, but there are some dissimilarity regarding the different age groups. While in Eastern Europe the level of support is quite the same for all cohorts and the increasing in the last 10 years is uniform, in the Western Europe, younger women are more willing to support female employment, than the older women are. However, the variation is higher for the cohort born between 1940 and 1949.



Graphic 3. Changes in Equal labour by cohorts and sex (male) in Eastern Europe



Graphic 4 Changes in Equal labour by cohorts and sex (male) in Western Europe

Discussion

Considering the data provided by the two waves of the EVS, one can say that, under the impact of cultural, social and economic changes, Europe tends to a common model of gender equality. In the Western countries, the changes produced by the shift from the industrial to post-industrial society are simultaneous with a cultural move from modern to post-modern culture. The gender values changed, too. The latent pattern of the new European society supports the equal involvement for women and men in the paid labour and a new division of gender roles within the household.

The data indicates that the Eastern Europe knows a similar trend under the impact of the globalization and the 'Europeanization'. After 1990, the population of post-communist countries changes its value orientation with respect to gender roles and gender equality. The contact with the Western culture and the impact of common legislation of European Union which was adopted by the accession countries too are among the factors which have played a role in this change. There are two main dimensions that shape the space of gender values: household modernity and equal labour. At the beginning of the decade, both of them recorded lower level in the Eastern than in the Western countries. However, during the nineties, Eastern Europe knew a greater increase on the tow axes. Moreover, the data indicates that the lower was the initial level of the support for gender equality on labour market and for the equal involvement on the domestic work, the greater is the variation of the two dimensions during the last decade.

The same findings are true for the variation in value orientation by cohorts. Younger cohorts have reached a higher starting level of gender equality

on the both dimensions. They change little these levels during the last decade. Older cohort knew some higher increase in the same period, such as the differences between generations became smaller. The population of Europe tends to a common model of gender equality which emphasizes woman involvement into the paid labour, the sharing of domestic work between partners and a new image of woman, seen as active economic person, not only as mother and caregiver.

There are some differences between the dynamic of the values shared by men and women in Eastern and Western Europe. Considering the levels and the dynamics of the gender values during the last decade, the men from the Western countries resemble more with the women from Western Europe, than with the men from the Eastern countries. One can say that the key factor here is the culture in which they have been socialized, not the gender. On the other hand, men from Eastern Europe significantly differ from women from the same region. Even if the communist regime has promoted the women involvement on the labour market, this was not an interiorized value. Thus, it was vulnerable to the transition challenges. Young men from the post-communist countries became less and less supportive to the female involvement in the paid work. This shift to the traditional values can be explained by the economic difficulties encountered by the population of Eastern Europe during the last decade. The rising of unemployment increased the competition between men and women on the labour market. Therefore, men become less willing to support female employment.

Considering the trends in the last decade one should expect that the common pattern of gender values will strengthen. Probably, in the new millennium gender differences will become smaller at least at the value patterns shared by the entire population. In the Western countries this tends to be true also for men - women differences, while in the ex-communist Europe is possible that men would display more conservative options than women.

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
Annex 1– Goodness- of – fit indexes.

Country	1990			1999		
	χ^2	$\Delta 2$ IFI	RMSEA	χ^2	$\Delta 2$ IFI	RMSEA
Belgium	99.505	0.997	0.045	94.921	0.996	0.053
Bulgaria	211.985	0.984	0.113	56.498	0.996	0.053
Czech Republic	285.395	0.990	0.092	493.871	0.982	0.129
Denmark	95.924	0.994	0.072	177.507	0.988	0.103
East Germany	191.549	0.990	0.094	230.054	0.984	0.120
Estonia	289.413	0.976	0.135	81.479	0.995	0.066
Finland	122.183	0.985	0.110	217.568	0.985	0.114
France	101.609	0.992	0.076	159.421	0.991	0.077
Hungary	53.929	0.997	0.051	96.277	0.993	0.074
Iceland	122.488	0.989	0.101	175.825	0.988	0.105
Italy	305.846	0.989	0.098	251.758	0.991	0.089


	1990			1999		
Latvia	123.529	0.989	0.090	165.010	0.989	0.099
Lithuania	321.395	0.977	0.143	375.085	0.974	0.154
Poland	106.712	0.992	0.079	56.200	0.997	0.050
Portugal	195.259	0.985	0.101	155.289	0.990	0.097
Romania	230.765	0.983	0.114	195.788	0.986	0.103
Slovakia	97.361	0.994	0.070	107.579	0.994	0.068
Slovenia	106.443	0.993	0.077	105.260	0.993	0.077
Spain	119.165	0.997	0.051	54.060	0.997	0.047
The Netherlands	179.973	0.988	0.104	128.576	0.992	0.087
United Kingdom	164.117	0.993	0.082	133.203	0.991	0.089
West Germany	349.464	0.988	0.103	253.060	0.982	0.124

Note: 1. Degrees of freedom = 15.

Annex 2




Graphic 2.1 The variation in Equal Labour (%) by the initial level of variable (1990)




Graphic 2.2 The variation in Household modernity (%) by the initial level of variable (1990)


Annex 3




Graphic 3.2 Changes in Household modernity by cohort in Western Europe




Graphic 3.4 Changes in Equal labour by cohorts in Western Europe




Graphic 3.1 Changes in Household modernity by cohorts in Eastern Europe




Graphic 3.3 Changes in Equal labour by cohorts in Eastern Europe




Graphic 3.6 Changes in household modernity by cohorts and sex (male) in Western Europe



Graphic 3.5 Changes in Household modernity by cohorts and sex (male) in Eastern Europe



Graphic 3.8 Changes in Equal labour by cohorts and sex (female) in Western Europe



Graphic 3.7 Changes in Equal labour by cohorts and sex (female) in Eastern Europe

